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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN LIBEL ACTIONS
The task of rewriting libel law which the Supreme Court began in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan' has continued for more than a decade, but the
fundamental premise remains the same-that libel law is incompatible 2 with
the guarantees of the first amendment. The Court concluded in New York
Times that the fear of libel suits induced self-censorship among publishers and
therefore had a "chilling effect" on the free expression of diverse opinion. 3 To
counteract the chilling effect the Court has adopted what has become the New
York Times "actual malice" rule: public figures and public officials cannot
recover damages for libel without proving the statement was made with either4
knowledge it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The media's protection from suits by other plaintiffs, those classified as
private figures, has been consistently less extensive. 5
The Court has assessed the chilling effect of different aspects of the
law of libel, such as the standard of care 6 and the various types of dam1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme Court's frequent and extensive revisions of libel laws
which previously had been within the exclusive domain of the states, have sometimes prompted
adverse criticism. E.g., El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 389 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), affd, 521 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975).
2. The Court has been unable to resolve this conflict, and instead has attempted to balance
the conflicting interests involved. "Nothing is more characteristic of the law of the First
Amendment-not the rhetoric, but the actual law of it-than the Supreme Court's resourceful
efforts to cushion rather than resolve clashes between the First Amendment and interests
conflicting with it." A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 78 (1975).
3. 376 U.S. at 277-80. The assumption that libel law is incompatible with the first amendment runs through all of the post-New York Times cases and is seldom questioned. But see
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 76 n.5 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
4. 376 U.S. at 279-80 (public official). This test was later extended to public figure cases.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336-37 & n.7 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 486 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("public figures are less deserving of protection than private figures"); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) ("private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than
public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.").
6. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), where the Court enunciated a
different standard of care for cases brought by public figures, based on "a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct" inconsistent with "the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155. This approach has been abandoned, and actual
malice is now the standard of care in both public official and public figure cases. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334-35 & n.6 (1974). The Court in Gertz held that in private figure
cases the states could establish their own standards of care. Id. at 347. The state courts have
reached varied results. Some have adopted a negligence standard. E.g., General Motors Corp v.
Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 171-72, 352 A.2d 810, 814-15 (1976). Others have adopted the actual malice
standard. E.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 98-99, 538 P.2d 450, 457,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (en banc). The New York Court of Appeals has revived the
Butts standard with a few modifications. Compare Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
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ages. 7 When it found the chilling effect of any aspect outweighed the state's
interest in providing a remedy for its defamed citizens the Court did not
hesitate to rewrite the common law.5 A minority of the Court has argued that
the chilling effect of punitive damages is so great that they can never be
awarded consistently with the guarantee of freedom of the press. 9 Although
the full Court has adopted the reasoning of the minority, 10 it has done so only
in a limited context.11 It has declared punitive damages are unconstitutional
"at least" in suits by private figures who have not satisfied the New York
12
Times test.
This Comment will examine the effect which each function of punitive
damages has on first amendment freedoms. It will attempt to resolve the
155 (1967) with Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d
569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975).
7.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388

U.S. 130, 159-61 (1967); see notes 34-62 infra and accompanying text.
8. The Court applied a balancing of interests approach familiar to other areas of constitutional law. The approach requires that when a state interest infringes on constitutional rights the
state must seek a less restrictive means of accomplishing its ends. Note, The Less Restrictive
Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification and Some Criteria, 27
Vand. L. Rev. 971, 972, 1011-16 (1974). See Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d

830, 835-36 (8th Cir. 1974); 28 Vand. L. Rev. 887, 896 (1975). The most protection the Court has
given t.e media was in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971), where a
plurality of justices held the actual malice standard was applicable for defamation arising out of
"all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern." Id. at 44. The
Court later retreated from this position. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).

9. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 72-78 (1971) (Harlan. J., dissenting);
id. at 78-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10. See note 46 infra.
11. Considerable speculation has been given to the question of what the ultimate constitutional status of punitive damages will be. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 897 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 785 (1977); Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026,
1029-30(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 740(1977); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 737
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill.
App. 3d 182, 197, 334 N.E.2d 79. 91-92 (1975);
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes § 62 1, comment f. at 288 (Tent. Draft No. 20,
1974); Arkin & Granquist, The Presumption of General Damages in the Law of Constitutional
Libel, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1482, 1484 n. 17 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Arkin & Granquist];
Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54
Texas L. Rev. 199, 215 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]; Slough, Swift Currents of Change
In The Law of Defamation, 45 J. Kan. B.A. 17, 20 (1976); Note, Punitive Damages in
Defamation Litigation: A Clear and Present Danger to Freedom of Speech, 64 Yale L.J. 610,
612-15 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages]; 6 Cumb. L. Rev. 267, 274 (197S); 29 Vand.
L. Rev. 870, 896 (1976); 2 Western St. U.L. Rev. 305, 317 (1975); 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 247, 257
(1976).
12. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). Gertz apparently left the common
law unchanged in other respects, so punitive damages may still be awarded in public figure cases
and in private figure cases where actual malice is shown. See Eaton, The American Law of
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va. L.
Rev. 1349, 1439-41 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Eaton].
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conflicting arguments over the constitutionality of punitive damages. Central
to those arguments is the question of whether the New York Times standard
provides the media with sufficient protection from punitive damages. It will
be suggested that there is sufficient protection in private figure cases, but not
in public figure and public official cases where the interest in encouraging free
debate on public issues is higher. 13 Consequently, it will be suggested that
punitive damages are unconstitutional in the latter case under ordinary
circumstances.
The problems which punitive damages present to small and specialized
media will also be examined. The chilling effect of such damages on small
media is especially great, because one large award could literally destroy a
small publisher's business. Some small media, such as partisan political
newspapers or the journals published by the leaders of social movements,4
offer a diversity of opinion not always found in the mass audience media.1
Therefore the first amendment policy of encouraging the circulation of different viewpoints should require special efforts to protect small media from the
chilling effects of punitive damages.
The competing interests involved in punitive damage libel cases may be
balanced in the following ways, which will be developed below: (1) by
continuing the present rules for recovery of punitive damages by private
figures; (2) by imposing a requirement of proof of actual injury in all other
cases to prevent a jury from using compensatory damages as punishment; (3)
by severely restricting the award of punitive damages to public figures and
public officials by the imposition of an additional requirement of intent to
injure; and (4) by defining public figures with respect to the circulation and

13. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968) ("But New York Times and
succeeding cases have emphasized that the stake of the people in . . . the conduct of public
officials is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would
protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amendment policies."); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964): "For good reason, 'no court of last resort In this
country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any
place in the American system of jurisprudence.' " Id. at 291, quoting Chicago v. Tribune Co.,
307 Ill. 595, 601, 139 N.E. 86, 88 (1923).
14. An examination of the titles of the articles and programs in the following small media
outlets suggests they would not be given any extended consideration in the mass media, although
the ideas might be of central concern to some segments of the population. Spannaus, Toward a
Capitalist-Marxist Alliance for Industrial Growth, New Solidarity, Mar. 4, 1977, at 7, col. I
(socialist labor newspaper); Revelations of a Gay Informant, Advocate, Feb. 23, 1977, at 12, col.
1 (gay liberation movement newspaper); Arizonans Fear Navajo Vote, Akwesasne Notes, Late
Autumn, 1976, at 15, col. I (American Indian movement newspaper); Glimpses of Women's
Liberation in Vietnam, Majority Report, Mar. 5, 1977, at 1, col. 1 (feminist newspaper); S-I
[criminal code reform bill] Still Threatens Civil Liberties, Socialist Republic, Winter 1976-77, at
4, col. 1 (political newsletter); Summer Writing Course with Allan Ginsberg, WBAI Folio, Dec.
13, 1976, at 3, col. 1 (program announcements for listener sponsored FM radio); FBI Infiltrates
Feminist Groups, Women and Revolution, Summer, 1976, at 21, col. 1 (Spartacist League
journal); The Marijuana Monopoly, Cannabis Cartel Seizes Control, Yipster Times, MarchApril, 1977, at 7, col. 1 (anarchist newspaper).
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subject matter of the media outlet to maximize the protection to small media
defendants.
1.

LIBEL DAMAGES AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

A. Traditional Libel Damages
At common law there are three types of damages available for libel:
general, special and punitive. s It is an "oddity of tort law"'16 that general
damages are awarded without proof of actual injury.' 7 Damage is presumed
to flow from the defamation, and general damages are awarded merely upon
showing publication of a statement falling into one of the categories considered defamatory per se. 18 For other libels, special damages of a pecuniary
nature must be proved. Once such special damages are established, however,
the plaintiff becomes eligible to recover for other nonpecuniary injury such as
humiliation, mental suffering or loss of companionship. 19 Generally, punitive
damages can be awarded in addition to general or special damages upon a
showing of malice in the common-law sense of spite, ill will or intent to injure
plaintiff. 20 Some jurisdictions require proof of actual injury before punitive
damages can be awarded. 21 Other courts condition an award of punitive
damages only upon a finding of nominal damages, 22 and cases can be found
where punitive damages alone were awarded without even a pretense of first
finding actual harm. 23 It has been suggested that the amount of punitive
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual damages. 2'4 But it
15. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 112 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as
Prosser].
16. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
17. Prosser, supra note 15, § 112, at 762. Presumed damages are exceedingly rare in tort law,
being found additionally only in trespass to land, See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163 (1965).
Shortly after New York Times, some commentators began to suggest presumed damages in libel
were unconstitutional. Arkin & Granquist, supra note 11, at 1488-93.
18. Prosser, supra note 15, § 112, at 762. Libel was actionable per se if the defamatory
statement imputed a crime, a loathsome disease, unchastity in a woman or affected the plaintiff
in his business or occupation. Id. at 763.
19. Id.at 760-61.
20. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974'; Gertz v Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 373 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Prosser, supra note 15. § 112, at
772.
21. Punitive Damages, supra note 11, at 614 n.28; cf. Note, Developments in the LawDamages, 1935-1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 120 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Developments).
22. E.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324. 340 (2d Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 396 U.S
1049 (1970) (one dollar compensatory damages awarded).
23. E.g., Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 805, 224 S.E 2d 132. 136
(1976) (no compensatory damages and $10,000 punitive damages); Garza v. San Antonio Light,
531 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (jury's verdict read "none" for general damages and
S25,000 for exemplary damages); Kent v. City of Buffalo, 61 Misc. 2d 142, 144, 304 N.Y.S.2d
949, 952 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 99 Ill.
App. 2d 1, 9-10. 241
N.E.2d 28, 32 (1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970).
24. E.g., Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941. 944 (5th Cir. 1948),
Thompson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n. 83 F. Supp. 656, 661 (N.D. Iowa 1949).
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is common to find cases in which juries have awarded tens of thousands of
dollars in punitive damages where little or no actual damages were proven.'B. Functions of Punitive Damages
Much of the confusion surrounding punitive damages stems from the fact
that they are awarded for different purposes in different cases. 2 The
most
6
common purposes are deterrence, retribution and compensation.
1.

Deterrence

Courts have discussed the issue of punitive damages in libel actions almost
exclusively in terms of their deterrent function. 27 Before punitive damages
can be justified as a deterrent, however, it must appear that the compensatory
damages are not already so large as to fulfill the same function. 28 It must also
be shown that the defendant will be effectively deterred by the award, 29 and
for this3 0reason evidence of defendant's wealth is usually admitted in a libel
action.
25.

See Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 340 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049

(1970); Saunders Hardware Five and Ten, Inc. v. Low, 307 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (per curiam); Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 179-80, 188 N.W.2d 494, 497-98 (1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1972) ($75,000 punitive and $75,000 compensatory damages with no
proof of injury). See also AG-Chem Equip. Co. v. Hanh, Inc., 480 F.2d 482, 491-92 (8th Cir.
1973).
26. Comment, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis, 60 Calif. L.
Rev. 191, 192 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Federal Statutes]; see Developments, supra note 2 1, at
119-20.
27. Deterrence is probably the most compelling justification for punitive damages. See
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 73-76 (1971)'(Harlan, J., dissenting). Punitive
damages in civil actions fill a void by deterring anti-social conduct which is not serious enough to
be punished criminally. See Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev 517, 523
(1957) (hereinafter cited as Exemplary Damages]. It is noteworthy, however, that the question of
whether punishment is a successful deterrent is still being debated in the criminal law. See, eg.,
Criminal Law and Its Processes 26-33 (3d ed. S. Kadish & M. Paulsen ed. 1975).
28. See Federal Statutes, supra note 26, at 214-215. In libel actions it can be argued that the
threat of compensatory damages and litigation expenses alone is sufficient to deter the publication
of defamatory falsehoods. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 170
(C.D. Cal. 1974); cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84-85 (1971) (Marshall, J.
dissenting).
29. Federal Statutes, supra note 26, at 213. There is evidence that newspaper publishers are
greatly concerned about the threat of libel judgments. See Editor & Publisher, May 10, 1975, at
66; Editor & Publisher, Nov. 2, 1974, at 11.
30. Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 111. App. 3d 182, 199-201, 334 N.E.2d 79, 93-95 (1975); Peisner
v. Detroit Free Press, 68 Mich. App. 360, 368, 242 N.W.2d 775, 779 (1976); Neigel v. Seaboard
Fin. Co., 68 N.J. Super. 542, 555, 173 A.2d 300, 307 (1961). The theory is that the jury has to
know something about the defendant's bank account before it can calculate a punitive award
with any value as a deterrent. Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 937 & n.5, 119
Cal. Rptr. 82, 89 & n.5 (1st Dist. 1975).
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There is a fundamental conflict between the policy of awarding punitive
damages as a deterrent and the policy of media protection developed in New
York Times and the cases which followed it.31 Under the policy of deterrence,
the law punishes one publisher of libel so others will refrain from publishing
similar defamatory statements and will take extra care to ensure what they
publish is not libelous.The policy running through the cases following New
York Times, however, is that the threat of punishment through libel suits
must be minimized 32 to ensure the free exchange of "diverse 33
and antagonistic"
ideas that the first amendment was designed to promote.
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of punitive damages and their deterrent effect in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts. 34 A jury had
awarded three million dollars in punitive damages against a nationally
distributed magazine, and the award had been reduced to $460,000 on
remittitur. The defendant argued that the power to award punitive damages
gave the jury the power to destroy a publisher's business through excessive
awards and was therefore impermissible under the first amendment. 35 Justice
Harlan, writing for a plurality of four justices, rejected the argument on the
ground that punitive damages serve a "wholly legitimate purpose" of deterring attacks on individual reputation, especially when compensatory damages
are too small to act as a deterrent. 36 Justice Harlan wrote that remittitur and
other means of judicial supervision over punitive damage awards are adequate protection against infringement on freedom of the press through excessive verdicts. 37 He concluded the Constitution does not require that publishers be exempted from assessments generally levied on other members of
the community. 38 However, Butts is the sole case in which the Supreme
39
Court has upheld an award of punitive damages for libel.
31.

See generally Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, 52 Colum. L. Rev.

521, 533 (1952); cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958).
32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294-95 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
33. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S 1, 20 (1945).
34.

388 U.S. 130 (1967).

35. Id. at 159.
36. Id. at 161. Justice Harlan later reiterated this argument in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 73 (1971) (dissenting opinion). He noted that even a large compensatory verdict
may not have a deterrent effect if the defendant is unusually wealthy. And in some cases even
though the defendant's conduct is both dangerous and morally blameworthy it might fail to result
in injury due only to fortuitious circumstances and no conpensatory damages would be awarded.
In such a case punitive damages serve society's interest in deterring dangerous conduct where
compensatory damages cannot. Id.
37. 388 U.S. at 160. Justice White has also argued that remittitur is a satisfactory check on
the jury's discretion in awarding punitive damages. He considered declaring punitive damages
unconstitutional "a classic example of judicial overkill." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.. 418 U.S.
323, 395-98 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Justice White pointed out that many jurisdictions require
punitive damages to bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages and others do not recognize
the doctrine of punitive damages at all. Id. at 397.
38. 388 U.S. at 160.
39. Punitive damage verdicts were reversed in two cases. See Letter Carriers Local 496 v.

1388

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Justice Marshall was one of the first members of the Court to conclude that
the deterrent function of punitive damages renders them unconstitutional. In
a dissenting opinion to Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,40 he pointed out
that punitive damage awards were so arbitrary that they produced selfcensorship. 4 1 The jury in Rosenbloom had returned $725,000 in punitive
damages based on an award of only $25,000 in general damages. Although
there was a reduction to $250,000 on remittitur, Justice Marshall considered it
insufficient to cure the arbitrary nature of the award. 42 He argued that "fear
of the extensive awards" available to an unsympathetic jury would necessarily
opinion in the news media and thereby frustrate first
curtail a free flow 4of
3
amendment policy.

Justice Marshall also noted that punitive damages gave juries a tool to
punish unorthodox and unpopular opinions. 44 The full Court expanded upon
this objection in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,4 5 where it held punitive
damages unconstitutional in private figure actions "at least" absent proof of
New York Times actual malice. 46 The case involved an attorney who had
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 269 (1974) ($45,000); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 40
(1971) ($250,000). In thirteen other cases damage verdicts were reversed, but it was not specified
if they were punitive or compensatory. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 329 (1974)
($50,000); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 270 (1971) ($20,000); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 729 (1968) ($5,000); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81
(1967) (per curiam) ($5,000); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) ($31,500); Henry v.
Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256
(1964) ($500,000); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250
U.S. 290, 293 (1919) ($10,000); Baker v. Warner, 231 U.S. 588, 591 (1913) ($10,000); Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 535 (1899) ($12,500); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311
(1884) (slander) ($6,000); Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 213-14 (1858). In
addition, the Court affirmed an $8,500 verdict in Pickford v. Talbott, 211 U.S. 199, 204 (1908),
but it did not specify whether it was compensatory or punitive. There is no discussion of punitive
damages in the case, although it appears plaintiff's attorney sought such damages. See id. at
208-09.
40. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
41. 403 U.S. at 84 (dissenting opinion). Some commentators believe punitive damages are the
only real threat to publishers. See R. Phelps & E. Hamilton, Libel 358 (1966); cf. Robertson,
supra note 11, at 260 n.381.
42. See 403 U.S. at 83 (dissenting opinion).
43. Id. The reluctance of other members of the Court to declare punitive damages unconstitutional in all cases has been due to a belief that they still have value as a deterrent. See notes 56-58
infra and accompanying text. In fact, even as it declared punitive damages unconstitutional in
Gertz, the Court acknowledged their deterrent function. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
44. 403 U.S. at 84 (dissenting opinion).
45. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
46. 418 U.S. at 349. The Court in Gertz attempted to adjust the various elements of libel law
in order to accommodate the stifling effects of libel to first amendment policy. Thus, while It
reduced the protection to the media by requiring a higher standard of care, Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 474-75 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), it increased media protection by
placing restrictions on the award of damages. 418 U.S. at 348-50.
Under Gertz, state courts may now choose their own standard of care in private figure cases
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been falsely labeled a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" by a monthly
magazine devoted to unpopular political views. 47 Although there was no
proof of actual injury, the jury awarded $50,000 in damages. 48 The Court
reversed the award on constitutional grounds, objecting that a jury's wide
discretion in calculating the amount of punitive damages gives it the power
"selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views.' 4 9
The Court in Gertz applied a balancing of interests analysis, recognizing

that since libel law impinges on activities protected by the first amendment it
must be supported by an equally compelling state interest in order to
withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Court found that a state's interest in
compensating its citizens for damaged reputation was sufficient to justify this
impingement.5 ° But the clear emphasis in the cases has been on compensation.5I Gertz found punitive damages serve a purpose "wholly irrelevant" to
providing they do not impose strict liability. Negligence is thus an acceptable standard. See 418
U.S. at 347-48. A number of state courts, however, have rejected the invitation to adopt
negligence on the ground it would not remove the stifling effect of damage awards on the media.
See Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 98-99, 538 P,2d 450. 4S7-58, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (en banc); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 585-86 (Ind. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976);
Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196. 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379
N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975). It is also noteworthy that prior to Gertz most members of the Supreme
Court considered negligence a clearly unacceptable standard in the first amendment area- See
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S 29, 50. 52-53 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U S. 374,
389 (1967). One conclusion to be drawn from this authority is that there is significant dissatisfaction with the adjustments which the Supreme Court made in the law of libel in Gertz. Perhaps
the Court should have gone further and declared punitive damages unconstitutional even in cases
where actual malice was shown. The opinion in Gertz made exactly the changes which Justice
Marshall had suggested in his dissent to Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29. 86-87
(1971) except for one element-Justice Marshall would have declared punitive damages unconstitutional in all cases, whether actual malice was proved or not.
47. 418 U.S. at 326. The magazine was "American Opinion," the official publication of the
John Birch Society. Id. at 325.
48. Id. at 329.
49. Id. at 350. In his dissent, Justice White discounted as insubstantial the stifling effect that
punitive damages have on the news media. He stressed the financial health of media conglomerates and their ability to disperse the burden of libel judgments over the broad base of their
shareholders. Id. at 390-92. He disregarded, however, the stifling effect of libel judgments on
small media defendants, many of whom publish politically unpopular viewpoints such as the
defendant in Gertz. See pt. III infra.
50. 418 U.S. at 341. The legitimate state interest which Gertz recognized was the state's
interest in seeing a plaintiff compensated for loss to his reputation. This is distinguishable from
the interest in protecting the plaintiff from harm to his reputation, which Justice Harlan had
argued constitutionally justified punitive damages as a deterrent. See Rnsenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 73 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Curtis Publishing Co. v Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 160-61 (1967).
51. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448. 465 (1976) (Powell, J.,concurring); Gertz v,
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 348-50 (1974); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114,
383 U.S. 53, 63-64 (1966); cf. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 589, 350 A.2d 688, 693
(1976).
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the state's interest in compensating injury. Therefore the Court held that at
least in private figure cases where the New York Times standard has not been
satisfied, punitive damages cannot be awarded consistently with the first
amendment.5 2 However, the Court took great pains to leave open the
question of whether punitive damages would
be allowed in cases where tile
3
plaintiff meets the New York Times test."
The reasoning of Gertz casts serious doubts on the validity of that portion of
the plurality opinion in Butts which upheld the constitutionality of punitive
damages. 5 4 In Butts, Justice Harlan had found punitive damages were
justified as a deterrent. In Gertz, however, the Court recognized that in
deterring libelous statements punitive damages also stifle free expression of
opinion. It found no compelling state interest which could justify this infringement on the first amendment.5 5 In a dissenting opinion to Rosenbloom,
Justice Harlan later repudiated his position in Butts and conceded "a more
precise balancing of the conflicting interests involved is called for in this
delicate area." 56 He concluded that the first amendment prohibited an award
of punitive damages unless the New York Times requirements were satisfied
and unless such damages "bear a reasonable and purposeful relationship to
the actual harm done."5 7 Justice Harlan refused, however, to abandon his
view that punitive damage awards have some value as a deterrent. He
declined to find them unconstitutional in all cases because they are needed in
the narrow range of cases where compensatory damages are too small to deter
future defamation. 5"
52. 418 U.S. at 350.
53. See id. at 349-50; note 85 infra.
54. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 897 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 785 (1977),
Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 737 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1975). However, there is no doubt that
Butts is still good law on the proposition for which it is most often cited, namely, that the
constitutional protection recognized against suits brought by public officials in New York Times
extends as well to cases brought by public figures. E.g., Tripoli v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.,
359 Mass. 150, 154, 268 N.E.2d 350, 353 (1971); Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 291 Minn.
468, 474, 193 N.W.2d 139, 144 (1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972).
55. 418 U.S. at 348-50. By declaring punitive damages unconstitutional because of the
self-censorship effect they produce on the media, the Court in Gertz also undercut Justice
Harlan's argument that a publisher should not be exempted from punitive damages "because of
the nature of his calling." 388 U.S. at 160.
56. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S 29, 72 n.3 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 77. Justice Harlan envisioned a jury instruction explaining the purposes of punitive
damages coupled with judicial review to make certain the punitive award was actually rationally
related to the compensatory award. Id. at 75-76 & n.4. His solution would provide no more
protection than the common-law rule that punitive damages not be excessive. The majority in
Gertz characterized this rule as "gentle" and insufficient to remove the stifling effect of punitive
damages. 418 U.S. at 350. Justice Marshall doubted whether such a jury instruction would
produce non-arbitrary punitive damage awards and suggested all that would be accomplished
would be the addition of the "chant of some new incantation" to the jury instruction. Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 85 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
58. Id.at 75-77.
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Justice Harlan's faith that the reasonable relationship rule can remedy the
arbitrary defects of punitive damages is not shared by all commentators. -9
Prosser suggested that at common law this rule was little more than a device
invoked by the court when it disagreed with the jury's bias. 60 Other commentators state that the rule is difficult to administer and merely offers the
defendant the hope of a "futile appeal. 61t The strongest objection, however, is
that the rule defeats the deterrent function of punitive damages. If the jury is
not free to adjust the amount of the punitive damage award to the character
of the defendant's wrong, the award loses its value as a warning that
particularly outrageous conduct will be severely punished. 62
The objections to the deterrent effects of punitive damages raised in Gertz
have been extended by a number of lower courts to hold punitive awards
unconstitutional in public figure cases 63 and in private figure cases" even
when the New York Times test has been met. The results in the private figure
cases, however, are of little value as precedent since the state courts which
decided them have never recognized the doctrine of punitive damages in any
tort case. 6s These courts merely invoked the constitutional arguments to
justify their previous damage policy. The public figure cases dealt more
squarely with the issues.
In Sprouse v. Clay Communication, InC.,66 a state court reversed a
$500,000 punitive damage award against a newspaper which had printed
defamatory material concerning a candidate for governor. It held that such
arbitrary awards lead to self-censorship and literally give the jury the power
to destroy a newspaper, especially if the publication "lack[s] substantial
financial assets." 67 However, Sprouse considered punitive damages too valu59. See Comment, Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Impact
on State Law and the First Amendment, 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 960, 982 n.108 (1975); Punitive
Damages, supra note 11, at 614-15.
60. Prosser, supra note 15, § 2, at 14.
61. Comment, Nominal Damages as a Basis for Awarding Punitive Damages in California, 3
Stan. L. Rev. 341, 346-47 (1951).
62. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 27, at 531; Developments, supra note 21, at 120;
Comment, Nominal Damages as a Basis for Awarding Punitive Damages in California, 3 Stan.
L. Rev. 341, 345 (1951).
63. Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 173-74 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Sprouse v. Clay
Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 692 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
64. Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, -, 546 P.2d 81. 86 (1976) (en
banc); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 169 (Mass. 1975). For the most
part, these courts have followed the reasoning set out in the Supreme Court cases by objecting to
the arbitrary nature of punitive damages. "[Tihe element most likely to give rise to self-censorship
is the uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages .... " 86 Wash. 2d at -. 546 P.2d at
86. "[Tlhe possibility of excessive and unbridled jury verdicts . . . may impermissibly chill the
exercise of First Amendment rights .... ." 330 N.E.2d at 169.
65. See Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538. 543. 84 N.E. 1018, 1020 (1903);
Farrar v. Tribune Publishing Co., 57 Wash. 2d 549, 552-53, 358 P.2d 792, 794-95 (1961) (en
banc); Ott v. Press Publishing Co., 40 Wash. 308, 312, 82 P. 403, 404 (1905).
66. 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
67. Id. at 690; see id. at 692. The recognition that punitive damages could put a publication
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able as a deterrent to abolish them completely. In dictum the court noted that
punitive damages may be awarded consistently with the first amendment if
the compensatory damages are not large enough to act as a deterrent. 68 In
Sprouse compensatory damages of $250,000 69were found sufficient to deter
publishers from engaging in similar abuses.
In Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co.,70 the court held that the state's interest in
employing punitive damages as a deterrent was not substantial enough to
justify the infringement of such damages on first amendment rights. 7' The
court found that the expense of defending against a libel suit and compensatory damages were sufficient deterrents to defamation. 7 2 In addition it held
that the state has less interest in deterring attacks on the reputation of public
figures. Public figures have thrust themselves "to the forefront of particular
public controversies" 73 and have enough influence that their statements 7in4
defense of their reputation will usually be published by the news media.
Even if deterrence could be considered a legitimate interest, Maheu concluded
that there were methods less restrictive of first amendment rights by which
punitive damages might be awarded as a deterrent."5
The court found one limited area in which deterrence is a legitimate state
interest which would justify the award of punitive damages for libel. That is
when the defamation is so aggravated that it could fairly be said to be an
invasion of the plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy.7 6 The court found
this state interest was not as compelling in libel actions brought by public
figures, who have voluntarily exposed themselves to attack by entering the
out of business is especially important in the case of small media defendants. See notes 242-43
infra and accompanying text.
68. 211 S.E.2d at 692-93. See 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 247, 256-57 (1976) for criticism of this
dictum, largely on the basis that it is not consistent with the trend of Supreme Court thought. An
analogous result was reached in Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, Civil No. 74-5516 (S.D.N.Y., July
30, 1976), rev'd, Civil No. 76-7479 (2d Cir., March 23, 1977), where the court looked to the
adequacy of the compensatory damages in upholding an award of punitive damages. Id. at 5-6.
69. 211 S.E.2d at 692. The court admitted there had been no evidence which would allow
the jury to calculate plaintiff's damages in a "mathematical way." Id. However, it held that
compensatory damages were justified by the mental anguish and humiliation the plaintiff must
have felt. Id. at 693. Little is gained by declaring punitive damages unconstitutional if damages
for emotional distress will be upheld without actual evidence to support them. One commentator
called such a result giving protection with one hand and taking it away with another. 10 Suffolk
U.L. Rev. 126, 140 (1975). See notes 276-88 infra and accompanying text.
70. 384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
71. 384 F. Supp. at 170-71.
72. Id. at 170. The court noted this was especially so in view of the "broad range" of damages
which Gertz allowed under the heading of actual injury. Id. at 170-71. See notes 286-88 infra and
accompanying text.
73. Id. at 171, quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
74. Id.
75. 384 F. Supp. at 173. The less restrictive alternatives suggested were placing a "dollar
limit" on the amount of punitive damages which could be awarded, restricting them to a multiple
of actual damages, or awarding costs and attorney's fees in their stead. Id.
76. Id. at 171-72.
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realm of public life. 7 7 Thus, the exception was confined to private figure cases
where the interest in privacy is stronger.
Maheu also addressed the question left open in Gertz 7s of whether the first
amendment prohibits the award of punitive damages in cases where the New
York Times test is met. It held that awareness by publishers that a jury may
return an arbitrary punitive damage award still induces self-censorship even
though the media may be greatly sheltered from liability under the New York
Times standard. 79 The standard provides protection only at the threshold of
liability, and a jury bent on punishing unpopular opinion could do so even
when the evidence did not fully satisfy the standard.8 0 Even though a plaintiff
or his attorney knows he must meet the New York Times test, the "jackpot of
8
open-ended recovery" through punitive damages still "invites] lawsuits." '
For these reasons, Maheu found the actual malice standard "does not cure the
self-censorship effect of punitive damages."8 2
At least three federal courts have reached the opposite result and have
upheld awards of punitive damages for libel to public figures when the New
York Times test had been satisfied.8 3 The argument most consistently made in
these cases is that punitive damages are needed as a deterrent against future
defamation.8 4 Some of the reasoning has been scanty. 8 - Cases which simply
77. 384 F. Supp. at 171.
78. 418 U.S. at 348-50; see note 85 infra.
79. 384 F. Supp. at 170.
80. Id. One commentator found the argument that juries will punish unpopular opinions
"may be more theoretical than real." 2 West. St. L. Rev. 305, 315 (1975). However, one need not
look far to find cases where juries have returned huge verdicts against publishers of unpopular
views. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S 323, 329 (1974) ($50,000 against the publisher
of a right wing magazine); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (19641 (S500,000
by a Southern jury against a newspaper soliciting contributions for a black civil rights leader
during a time of racial unrest).
81. 384 F. Supp. at 170.
82. Id.
83. Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Car. 1976). cert.
denied, 97 S. CL 740 (1977); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 737-38 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 396 U S. 1049 (19701.
More often courts uphold a punitive damage award without any discussion of thl: substantive law
of punitive damages. E.g., Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 897 (2d Cir. 19761, cert. denied. 97
S. Ct. 785 (1977).
84. Occasionally a court will also justify punitive damages on the ground they compensate
plaintiff for attorney's fees. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, Civil No. 74-5516, at 6 (S.D.N.Y., July
30, 1976), rev'd, Civil No. 76-7479 (2d Cir., March 23, 1977). Some courts argue punitive
damages are not arbitrary because the jury's discretion can be controlled by the trial judge
through remittitur. Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 737-38 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The reliance
on remittitur, however, is grounded in the faith that few judges will share a jury's predisposition
to punish unpopular opinion. There has been some reluctance to place such faith in the discretion
of judges when sensitive first amendment values are at stake. See Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J..
dissenting); Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 173 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Remittitur has
been criticized as an ineffective check on a jury's discretion. See C. McCormick. Handbook on
the Law of Damages § 77, at 276 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McCormickl.
85. Two of these cases have simply concluded that speech is not protected by the first
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state that punitive damages are a necessary deterrent 6 have ignored the
conflict between deterrence and the first amendment and the balancing
approach which the Supreme Court has adopted to resolve the conflict. Only
one of these cases, Appleyard v. TransamericanPress, Inc. ,87 considered this
problem. It concluded that when punitive damages are excessive they could
indeed infringe on the first amendment.88 But the Appleyard court did not
consider the $5,000 punitive damage award before it as excessive, so it did not
reach the question of what type of protection is needed against a large
arbitrary punitive damage award.8 9
2.

Retribution

Courts seldom expressly justify an award of punitive damages on the
grounds of retribution, 9" but commentators believe the desire to punish a
amendment when New York Times actual malice is demonstrated. Appleyard v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 740 (1977); Davis v.
Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 737-38 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Both of the cases rely heavily on the opinion in

Gertz. However, Gertz took particular pains to leave open the question of whether punitive
damages may be awarded in cases where the plaintiff successfully proves New York Times actual
malice on the part of the publisher. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49, 350
(1974). In at least one other context the Court has declined to reach the question of whether or not
speech may be punished even though it was uttered with actual malice. Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 n.6 (1968) (punishing teacher with dismissal for exercising right to free
speech). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964) (criminal libel). Since the Court
has declined to reach the question in a number of contexts, it is probable that the cases which
read Gertz as implying that speech is not protected if actual malice is proven are wrong. In
addition to relying on Gertz, the Appleyard decision attempts to reach the conclusion by
independent reasoning. It stated that the New York Times actual malice rule was not designed to
protect false statements of fact, but only to insure that the media would not feel restrained in their
criticism of official conduct. Thus it would follow that defamation published with actual malice
does not fall within the protection of New York Times because "there is no good-faith attempt to
point out real abuses to the public." 539 F.2d at 1030. The conclusion apparently ignores,
however, the Supreme Court's expansion of first amendment protection beyond the realm of
criticism of official conduct into broader areas of public concern. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974) (establishing constitutional damages rules in private figure
cases); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)
(constitutional privilege for public figures as well as public officials). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly said that false statements of fact may indeed be protected by the Constitution, because
extending protection to some falsehood may be the only way to insure protection of "speech that
matters." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974); accord, Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 472 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 732 (1968).

86.

E.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 341 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.

1049 (1970).
87. 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976).
88. 539 F.2d at 1030.

89. Id.
90. But see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 73 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("the State always retains an interest in punishing more severely conduct that, although it causes
the same effect, is more morally blameworthy."); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172
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wrongdoing defendant is often the motive for awarding punitive damages. 9 1
Compensatory damages have little retributive function because they are
expressly calculated to make the plaintiff whole. But there is necessarily an
element of retribution in the award of punitive damages because they are
taken from the defendant and given to the plaintiff for no such discernable
reason. 9 7 Historically, it was assumed that a plaintiff who was vindicated by
an award of punitive damages would have no need to resort to self-help and a
breach of the peace would thereby be avoided. 93 That rationale hardly seems
justifiable in modern society, 94 especially in the case of a tort such as libel
which does not involve physical confrontation.
It has been suggested that one reason the courts have avoided justifying
punitive damages in libel solely on the grounds that false speech must be
punished for punishment's sake is that they anticipate arguments that such
punishment cannot be imposed without the criminal safeguards guaranteed by
the Constitution. 95 These arguments have inspired more interest among
commentators than the courts. 96 The objection that punitive damages violate
the prohibition against double jeopardy has been litigated, although it is
usually dismissed summarily on the grounds that double jeopardy as used in
the Constitution applies only to criminal proceedings. 97 Indiana is the only
U.s. 534, 553 (1899) (libel decision citing punishment as justification for punitive damages);
Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 341 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970) C'No
doubt the jury believed... the malice-inspired smears on Senator Goldwater's reputation should
be removed and its perpetrators punished."). The courts are more apt to express a punishment
rationale in non-libel contexts; e.g., Tolle v. Interstate Systems Truck Lines, Inc., 1 IIl. Dec. 437,
, 356 N.E.2d 625, 626 (1976) (personal injury); Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co.. 291
N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976) (contract).
91. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 27, at 521-22; Comment, The Imposition of
Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1158,
1161-62 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Punishment]; Comment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible
Application in Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1036, 1039-41 (1960).
92. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1177 n.7 (1931)
[hereinafter cited as Morris]; see Exemplary Damages, supra note 27, at 523. Punitive damages
are more personal than a criminal fine, which is paid into the public treasury. Punishment, supra
note 91, at 1162.
93. See id.; Exemplary Damages, supra note 27, at 522.
94. See Federal Statutes, supra note 26, at 210.
95. Morris, supra note 92, at 1197.
96. See McCormick, supra note 84, § 77, at 275-76; Morris, supra note 92, at 1197;
Exemplary Damages, supra note 27, at 524-25; Punitive Damages, supra note 11, at 612-13.
Perhaps the most satisfactory conclusion in the commentary is that criminal safeguards should be
confined to the criminal law, where the stigma and sanctions of conviction are most severe. See
Punishment, supra note 91, at 1181. The author concludes, however, that punitive damages
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy when they are levied following a conviction for
the same conduct. Id. at 1183, 1185.
97. See Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 663 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Svejcara v. Whitman, 82 N.M. 739, 741, 487 P.2d 167, 169 (1971). McCormick dismissed the
objections saying it is the "tendency of the times" to reduce criminal safeguards anyway.
McCormick, supra note 84, § 77, at 277-78.
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state to hold that punitive damages cannot be assessed constitutionally for an
act which is also subject to criminal penalties. 98 The Supreme Court has
shown no inclination to follow Indiana's lead, 99 however it has invoked this
line of reasoning at least once in the first amendment area. One of the grounds
the Court cited in overturning the libel judgment in New York Times was that
it was imposed without the safeguards which would have been available to
the defendant if he had been prosecuted for criminal libel. 100
Even when it has upheld a criminal libel statute, the Supreme Court has
avoided the rationale of retribution or statements to the effect that libelous
speech may be punished. 10 1 While there is a clear aversion to the idea of
punishing speech in a number of cases, libel is one of the three categories of
speech which do not enjoy full first amendment protection.' 0 2 The others are
obscenity and what might be called incendiary speech, that which threatens
violence or an immediate breach of the peace. 10 3 While there are clear
precedents upholding the imposition of punishment for obscenity' 0 4 and
incendiary speech,' 05 in the case of defamation the precedents are not as
clear.
The case most often cited for the proposition that defamatory speech may
be punished is Beauharnaisv. Illinois,10 6 in which the Supreme Court upheld
a criminal libel statute. The statute in question prohibited the public dissemination of statements so derogating a racial group that a "breach of the peace
98. Taber v. Hutson, S Ind. 322, 325 (1854); see Aldrige, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary
Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 Ind. L.J. 123 (1945). The same reasoning has been cited In
states which have refused to recognize the doctrine of punitive damages. See Fay v. Parker, 53
N.H. 342, 386-93 (1873).
99. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1956); Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
100. 376 U.S. at 277-78. Accord, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964) ("we see no
merit in the argument that criminal libel statutes serve interests distinct from those secured by
civil libel laws . . .
101. There is one notable exception, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which contains
dictum that "punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential to the
protection of the public . . . ." Id. at 715. This dictum represents the interpretation usually given
to the first amendment before the New York Times doctrine was developed. See 2 J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1884. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 159-61 (1967) upheld an award of punitive damages for libel without discussing the
rationale of retribution. See notes 34-39 and 54-62 supra and accompanying text.
102. The classic list of the types of speech outside the first amendment is contained In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942): "These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words--those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
103. The term incendiary is used to suggest that the "fighting words" cases following
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) may be logically grouped with the "clear and
present danger" cases following Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
104. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957).
105. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
106. 343 U.S. 250 (1952); see, e.g., Porter v. Kimzey, 309 F. Supp. 993, 996 n.3 (N.D. Ga.
1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
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or riots"
might immediately result. Given the past history of violent racial
incidents in Illinois, the Court found that the state legislature could have
reasonably concluded that racist material circulated in public might so inflame
a crowd as to spark a riot. 10 8 Therefore, it would seem that Beauharnais
speaks more to the third category of speech-that which tends to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It is at least arguable that Beauharnaisreally
stands for the principle that incendiary speech may be punished.10 9
Beauharnaisis the only constitutional case in which the Supreme Court has
upheld a conviction for criminal libel.1 0 It has in two other instances struck
down state criminal libel laws as unconstitutional."' In one of these cases,
Garrison v. Louisiana,"2 the Court suggested it would have upheld the
statute if it had been so narrowly drafted as to apply only to speech which
created an immediate breach of the peace. The Court quoted with approval a
passage from the Model Penal Code stating speech is an inappropriate subject
"for penal control" unless it incites violence." 3 Thus, as it did in Beauhar107. 343 U.S. at 251.
108. Id. at 258-61. The reason the Court declined to hold criminal libel statutes unconstitutional may have been the wide acceptance of such statutes in the United States and the strong
common-law tradition of criminal libel. See Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel,
52 Colum. L. Rev. 521, 533-34 (1952). Even though statutes are common, however, it appears
prosecutions for criminal libel are seldom brought. Although no statistics appear to have been
compiled in the United States, this assertion is borne out by a study reported in Britain, where
criminal libel prosecutions would, if anything, be expected to be more numerous because they do
not conflict with constitutional free press guarantees. The study indicated that the annual average
number of libel prosecutions in England and Wales "from 1950 to 1954 was four, for 1955 to 1959
two, and for 1960 to 1964 two." The numbers decreased to zero in 1967 and one each in 1969,
1971 and 1973. See Report of the Committee on Defamation, Cmnd. No. 5909, at 121 (1975).
109. This reading of Beauharnais is supported by the fact that the Court almost conscientiously avoided making any statement that libelous speech may be punished. It always stated the
problem in conditional terms such as: "But if an utterance directed at an individual may be the
object of criminal sanctions .... ." 343 U.S. at 258. Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 295, 321 (1958).
110. The Court also upheld a conviction for criminal libel under a Philippine statute in
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914). However, the case is of no constitutional
significance since the Constitution does not apply of its own force in the Philippines. Id. at 98; see
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904).
111. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). In
Ashton the Court held a state common-law crime of criminal libel was unconstitutionally vague.
384 U.S. at 198-201. In Garrison the Court applied the New York Times actual malice rule. The
Louisiana statute incorporated the common-law rule of criminal libel that prohibited injurious
words spoken with bad motive, even if they were true. The Court found that this provision
violated the New York Times rule, which absolutely protects true speech. 379 U.S. at 78. There
is an argument that Beauharnais has been overruled by these two later cases. See Tollett v.
United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 (8th Cir. 1973) ("In fact, with the advent of Garrison and
Ashton, a strong argument may be made that there remains little constitutional vitality to
criminal libel laws."); T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 396 (1970); but see
Eberle v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal. App. 3d 423, 433, 127 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600 (2d Dist. 1976).
112. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
113. Id. at 70, quoting Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961, § 250.7, Comments, at
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nais, the Court implied in Garrison that the only time when the punishment
of libelous speech is justified is when the speech is also incendiary.
Punitive damages might be more plausibly justified under the rubric of
retribution in cases where it can be shown that they invade a fundamental
right.11 4 In such a case punitive damages would stigmatize the party who5
invaded the right, thereby vindicating its importance in the eyes of society. 116
A person's interest in his or her good name is clearly an important right,"
which one authority at least has suggested deserves constitutional protection. 1 17 Thus, the retributive function of punitive damages might justify the
award of such damages because they vindicate the importance of the right to
an unblemished reputation. This may explain the feeling apparent in some of
the libel cases that something more than actual damages should be awarded in
view of the invidiousness of the wrong committed by publication of defamatory falsehood. 118
Rather than adopt the rationale of retribution, however, the courts have
demonstrated an aversion to the idea of punishing speech. This aversion is
apparent even in cases where speech is libelous, and it is often the strongest in
cases where the speaker is not powerful enough to protect his own rights. For
example, a lifeguard could not be fired for criticizing officials of the municipality which employed him, even if his criticism was libelous. 1 19 Prison
officials cannot suppress the publication of a small newspaper printed by the
prisoners even though the newspaper contains libelous statements. 120 And in
114. It is common for courts to award damages for deprivation of constitutional rights even
though no proof of injury is offered. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (right to
vote). The cases sometimes purport to award damages under a category such as emotional distress
even though no proof of emotional harm has been made. See Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491
F.2d 634, 636-38 (7th Cir. 1974). Or they may expressly state that the damages are "nonpunitive." Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 579 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976). But it is often clear from the language of the decisions that the courts
intend these damages to vindicate the invasion of the constitutional right. See Id. ("Plaintiff Is
entitled to damages for that constitutional violation.'); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir.
1919) ("In the eyes of the law this right (to vote] is so valuable that damages are presumed from
the wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of actual loss of money, property, or any other
valuable thing . .

").

115. See Federal Statutes, supra note 26, at 211.
116. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (The interest in
reputation "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
93 & n.50 (1976).
117. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 727, 731-32, 734 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 471-72 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. See Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1030 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 740 (1977); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, Civil No. 74-5516, at 5-6 (S.D.N.Y.,
July 30, 1976), rev'd, Civil No. 76-7479 (2d Cir., March 23, 1977); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 692-93 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
119. Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1970).
120. The Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495, 500 (D. Vt. 1974); see Carothers v.
Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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the leading case interpreting the Landrum-Griffin Act's provision on speech in
union meetings, the court held the Act prohibits a union from disciplining a
member for voicing his opinions, even if his statements were libelous.12 1 The
court in that decision laid special emphasis1 22on the imbalance of power
between union officials and union members.
This antipathy toward punishing speech makes it unlikely that the Court
would ever recognize a legitimate state interest in punitive damages in libel
actions based on their retributive function. 23 Moreover, the fact that a
number of these cases dealt with speakers not powerful enough to protect
their own rights suggests that punitive damages as24 retribution are even more
suspect in the case of small media defendants.1
3. Compensation
Punitive damages developed historically as a compensatory device, allowing recovery for injuries which the courts did not recognize as compensa121. Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1963); see Morrissey v. National
Maritime Union, 397 F. Supp. 659, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 544 F.2d 19
(2d Cir. 1976).
122. 316 F.2d at 451. The consensus of the cases is that although the union official may not
punish the union member, he may sue for libel in the civil courts. Id.; see Stark v. Carpenters
Dist. Council, 219 F. Supp. 528, 537 (D. Minn. 1963). However, a contrary conclusion might be
suggested by a recent California case holding that statements which would otherwise be libelous
might not be actionable if they were uttered in the context of a labor dispute. See Gregory v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 601, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644, 552 P.2d 425, 428
(1976).
123. The antipathy to the idea of punishing speech can be found in a wide range of cases. The
Supreme Court has held that a teacher's false statements critical of the school board could not be
used as grounds for punishing him with dismissal, because it would stifle free discussion.
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). The Court expressly left open the question
of whether the teacher could have been punished if his statement had been uttered with New
York Times actual malice. Id. at 574 n.6. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962).
Lower courts have held that students may not be punished for publishing their own newspaper,
even when it criticizes school discipline, Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970), or when it might tend to cause a "disturbance." Shanley v.
Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir. 1972); contra, Eisner v. Board of Educ.,
440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971).
Newspaper licensing taxes have been struck down on the ground that they tend to limit
circulation of knowledge and are suspiciously similar to a penalty. See Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) ("The form in which the tax is imposed is in itself suspicious.
... Itis measured alone by the extent of the circulation... with the plain purpose of penalizing
the publishers . . ...
"). The Court suggested that only a non-discriminatory tax applied to the
population generally could be levied on newspapers. Id. at 250. But there are cases in which the
courts have refused to apply even a non-discriminatory tax to certain small publications on the
grounds it would unduly stifle the expression of diverse viewpoints if applied to such small
entities. Long v. Anaheim, 255 Cal. App. 2d 191, 198-99, 63 Cal. Rptr. 56, 61 (4th Dist. 1967);
see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Gall v. Lawler, 322 F. Supp. 1223, 1225
(E.D. Wis. 1971).
124. See pt. III infra.
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125

ble.
There is still no doubt some consensus that punitive damages are
justified to correct one of the "glaring defects" in our judicial system-denial
of recovery for legal fees. 126 While the feeling that punitive damages help
compensate a plaintiff may underlie the reasoning in some cases,1 27 it is
insufficient justification in itself for the award of such damages, especially in
the sensitive first amendment area of libel law. 128 Even if the need for
compensation for legal fees is compelling, 1 29 a less restrictive means to
accomplish this should be sought to minimize the chilling effects of arbitrary
punitive damage awards. Legislation to permit recovery of attorney's fees has
been suggested as one such alternative,1 30 or a court could adopt a judicial
rule such as the one in Connecticut which restricts punitive damages to
3
proven legal fees.' '
II. PRIVATE FIGURES VS. PUBLIC FIGURES AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS
The Supreme Court distinguishes between two groups of plaintiffs for the
purposes of assessing liability in libel actions. The first category includes both
public officials--individuals employed in a government capacity' 32-and
public figures-those who occupy a position of special prominence in society
or have thrust themselves into the center of a public controversy. 33 The
second group of plaintiffs, private figures, includes everyone else.1 34 The state
125. Exemplary Damages, supra note 27, at 519-20; Punishment, supra note 91, at 1163. At
least one state still allows punitive damages to compensate plaintiff for mental suffering. See Wise
v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922).
126. McCormick, supra note 84, § 77, at 277. One state, in fact, expressly limits recovery of
punitive damages in libel actions to litigation expenses less costs. Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn.
236, 238, 102 A. 640, 641 (1917).
127. See Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en
banc); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, Civil No. 74-5516, at 6 (S.D.N.Y., July 30, 1976), rcv'd, Civil
No. 76-7479 (2d Cir., March 23, 1977). Even one commentator who argued for the abolition of
punitive damages in libel cases recognized their compensatory function and suggested that they be
replaced by a statutory scheme for recovery of litigation expenses. See Punitive Damages, supra
note 11, at 615.
128. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 73 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
Exemplary Damages, supra note 27, at 522; cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
348-50 (1974).
129. The Supreme Court has found a legitimate state interest in compensating the plaintiff for
injury to reputation, but it is noteworthy that the Court made no mention of attorney's fees In Its
discussion of compensation. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 350 (1974). The
Court made it clear that giving the jury discretion to award damages is inconsistent with the
guarantees of the first amendment, and therefore it imposed the requirement of proof of actual
injury as a condition to any recovery. 418 U.S at 348-50. Of course, punitive damages fall to meet
the requirements of being supported by proof of injury.
130. See Punitive Damages, supra note 11, at 615.
131. See Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 238, 102 A. 640, 641 (1917).
132. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (deputy sheriff); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966) (employee in charge of county recreation area); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (city commissioner).
133. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
134. Id. at 342-43.
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interest in awarding punitive damages as a deterrent, which is the only
function of punitive damages which retains any justification at all under the
first amendment, 135 will now be examined with respect to each of these two
groups of libel plaintiffs.
The state has more of an interest in deterring defamation in the case of
private figures, who have surrendered none of their right of personal privacy
by entering public life and who are seldom involved in public debate. 136 The
Supreme Court has set the New York Times test as the minimum requirement
for the recovery of punitive damages in such cases. 137 This standard
sufficiently balances the state's interest in deterring defamation of private
figures with the policy of protecting the media from the chilling effects of
punitive damages.
These chilling effects are a less tolerable infringement on the first amendment, however, in cases involving public figures and public officials, who are
more likely to be involved in issues of serious public debate. 138 In these areas
the media should be given the widest latitude in which to operate. It is
therefore submitted the New York Times test is not sufficient to shield
1
publishers and broadcasters from the stifling effects of punitive damages. 39 It
40
will be suggested an additional requirement of intent to injure is needed.1

A. State Interest in Awarding Punitive Damages
to Private Figures
The interest in free public debate, which allows the media to make even
"vehement" and "caustic" attacks on public officials,' 4' does not extend to
facts involved in the life of a private figure. 142 Public figures and public
officials command great news interest, and their statements in defense of their
reputation will most likely be given high exposure by the media.'4 3 By
thrusting themselves into events of public concern, such plaintiffs have held
up their reputation to "the risk of closer public scrutiny"'" and thereby risked
being defamed. 145 The need for a deterrent to defamation is greater in cases
involving a private figure, whose statements in defense of his reputation are
likely to be ignored by the media and who has "relinquished no part of his
"146
interest in the protection of his own good name ....
Although all libel plaintiffs have an interest in receiving compensation for
135.
136.

See pt. I(B) supra.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); pt. II(A) infra.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

418 U.S. at 350.
See id. at 342-43.
Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 170 (C.D. Cal. 1974); see pt. I(A) infra.
See pt. II(C) infra.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S 323, 344 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 345; Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 171 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
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injury to their reputation, 147 private figure plaintiffs have a greater interest in
preventing attention from being focused on their lives in the first place . 48
This interest is protected by the tort of unauthorized intrusion or prying into

an individual's affairs, 149 sometimes characterized as the right to be left

alone15 ° or the right of privacy. 151 Courts sometimes state that an individual

has a fundamental right to remain free from unauthorized prying into the
facts of his life, 1 52 and that this right must be balanced against the news
media's first amendment rights.' 5 3 Thus if punitive damages serve the func-

tion of deterring such unauthorized prying, they might be awarded despite
their chilling effects on the media. 54 Since private figure plaintiffs have a
147. The Supreme Court has recognized a legitimate state interest in compensating the libel
plaintiff for injury to reputation. Id. at 348. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976),
however, the Court indicated there might be other interests protected by libel law which justify
infringement on the first amendment. There the Court affirmed an award of damages for
emotional distress following a defamatory publication. The plaintiff had originally filed a claim
for injury to reputation, but later dropped it. On its facts, the case arguably could have supported
an action for intrusion or prying into private details of the plaintiff's life, since the media
defendant had publicized sensational details about the plaintiff's sex life and divorce.
148. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Ink., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). Perhaps the most basic
attribute of the "right of privacy" recognized by lawyers and social scientists is the Individual's
right "to control the circulation of information relating to him." A. Miller, Assault on Privacy 25
(1971). This right is sometimes characterized as fundamental under the Constitution. See City of
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (en banc). But
see Evans v. Carey, 53 App. Div. 2d 109, 116, 385 N.Y.S.2d 965, 970 (4th Dep't 1976).
149. Prosser, supra note 15, § 117, at 804; see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 488 (1975).
150. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled on other grounds, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Warren & Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890), quoting Cooley on Torts 29(2d ed. 1888).
151. Prosser, supra note 15, § 117, at 804.
152. E.g., Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300, 1303 (D. Minn. 1976) ("It is true that under
some circumstances there can be such a gross abuse of privacy as to amount to an abridgment of
fundamental constitutional guarantees."); People ex rel. Ford v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574,
576-77 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972); Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,
284 F. Supp. 925, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). But
see Ellingburg v. Lucas, 518 F.2d 1196, 1197 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (conclusory).
153. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd on other
grounds, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court held a plaintiff's right to keep information
about himself private was more compelling than the first amendment rights of a news magazine,
whose reporters use a hidden microphone and camera to gather information for an article. See
also Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 540-41, 483 P.2d 34, 42, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866, 874 (1971); Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20
N.Y.L. Forum 453 (1975). The Supreme Court has left the states the task of protecting privacy In
the sense of the right to be left alone. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967). Punitive
damages is one remedy which a state may use to deter invasions of this right.
154. It is perhaps significant that the recognition of the legitimate state interest in seeing
private figure plaintiffs compensated for injury to reputation, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 348 (1974), comes at a time when the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional
right of privacy in other cases. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). It is quite possible that it was the

1977]

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN LIBEL

1403
ss

greater interest in keeping the details of their lives undisclosed,'
punitive
damages are more appropriate in such cases. Public figures or public officials
subject even their "personal attributes" and character to the media's inspection by entering public life, 1 5 6 and they have less of an interest in deterring
prying into their affairs.
The conclusion is that punitive damages are constitutionally justified in
private figure libel cases where the New York Times requirements are
satisfied, because they deter prying into the plaintiff's affairs and are less likely
to stifle free debate. In public figure and public official cases the objections to
punitive damages assume their full force, however, and there is less of an
interest in privacy to justify them. The only area in which public officials and
public figures retain sufficient interest in privacy to justify an award of
punitive damages is in the rare case where a publisher intentionally sets out to
destroy the plaintiff's reputation with falsehoods. Outside this narrow area,
which will be discussed below,' 5 7 the best rule would be to prohibit the award
of punitive damages in public figure and public official cases.
B.

Inadequacy of the Reckless Disregard Test to Protect
the Media from Punitive Damages in Public
Figure and Public Official Cases
The fact that large, 5 8 arbitrary 9 punitive damage verdicts are still
frequently affirmed in libel cases raises the question of whether the second
expansion of the right of privacy which led the Court to reject the approach of Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971), and find a stronger interest in preventing the media
from damaging the reputation of private figure plaintiffs in Gertz. See note 8 supra. Some of the
recent decisions have come close to stating that a private figure's interest in his reputation enjoys
some constitutional protection. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455-56 (1976); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 341
(1974), quoting Justice Stewart's assertion in a concurring opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 92 (1966) that the "private personality" is protected by the Constitution.
But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), where the Court declined to find any
infringement of privacy when plaintiff's name was included on a circular of active shoplifters
compiled by police from arrest records. The Court held the injury to plaintiff's reputation was far
removed from the context in which the right of privacy had been given constitutional
protection-matters of procreation and child rearing. Id. While the plaintiff might have had an
action for defamation, he had no grounds on which to claim constitutional protection for such
injury to reputation. Id. at 713-14. The case can be distinguished on its facts, however, because it
dealt with the publication of an "official act," the arrest of the plaintiff. It thus belongs to the
doctrine of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, that the first amendment protects the
publication of "information released to the public in official court records." Id. at 496.
155. See Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 171-72 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
156. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974), quoting Garrison v. Louisana,
379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964); see Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Irving, 49 App. Div. 2d 445, 449, 375
N.Y.S.2d 864, 868 (1st Dep't 1975) ("The right of privacy under the law was never contemplated
to exclude or limit, within reasonable bounds, the right to speak and write concerning a public
figure.').
157. See pt. II(C)(2) infra.
158. In the recorded federal cases in 1976 punitive damage verdicts as large as $50,000 were
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part of the New York Times test-reckless disregard of the truth-sufficiently
protects the media from the chilling effects of such damages in public figure
and public official cases. The reckless disregard standard is likely to be
misapplied in cases where the publisher's conduct has been in some way
reprehensible or morally blameworthy. In such a case the jury is likely to
return a large punitive damage award only to satisfy its sense of moral
outrage, and an appellate court may uphold the result on the basis of
circumstantial evidence only because it is reluctant to disturb the judgment of
the trier of fact. 160 This compounds the chilling effects of punitive damages,
because large damage awards in the reported cases are an invitation to
litigation even though a plaintiff
has only a slim hope of satisfying the New
16
York Times requirements. 1
The initial problem lies with the jury. A jury intent on punishing the
defendant with a damage award may circumvent the reckless disregard
instruction simply by ignoring it. 162 If the parties to the action are themselves
either generally respected or generally disliked, the jury may use public
opinion as a guide for returning a damage award. Popular public figure
plaintiffs such as a respected war hero 63 and a nationally known football
coach 1 " have recovered huge punitive awards, while a jury assessed $75,000
in punitive damages based on one dollar in actual damages
in a suit against a
16
small magazine publisher associated with pornography. Appellate courts often uphold punitive damage awards in public figure or
public official cases even though there may be considerable questions as to
whether the New York Times standard has been satisfied or not. The standard
affirmed for libel. Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 936 (E.D. Mich. 1976). The
court reduced the jury's punitive damage award of $300,000. Id.
159. In the recorded federal cases in 1976 the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages in
libel cases ranged from a low of two-to-five, see Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924,
936 (E.D. Mich. 1976), to a high of one-to-one thousand, see Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882,
897 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 785 (1977).
160. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 896 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 785
(1977). The inferences which the court made in finding reckless disregard may be questioned. See
notes 173-74 infra and accompanying text. Perhaps for this reason the court concluded Its
discussion of liability by stating it was reluctant to disturb the trial court, since it had no
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.
161. Most libel cases are settled before they reach trial. It is estimated that less than 0.5
percent of all libel actions filed are litigated. Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an
Action for Libel, 34 Va. L. Rev. 867, 869 n.5 (1948).
162. 10 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 126, 140 (1975).
163.
Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955). The
plaintiff received a total of $175,000 in punitive damages based on one dollar In compensatory
damages. Id. at 431.
164. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 138 (1967) (three million dollars In
punitive damages, reduced on remittitur to $400,000).
165. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
The jury assessed $25,000 in punitive damages against Ginzburg and $50,000 against a defendant
magazine, of which he was the sole stockholder. Id. at 328. Ginzburg was prosecuted on
obscenity charges in connection with his more erotic publications and unsuccessfully appealed his
conviction to the Supreme Court. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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requires proof of a "state of mind" in those persons who are responsible for
the publication.' 66 Since a defendant would seldom admit that he knowingly
or recklessly published a falsehood, the plaintiff must rely on circumstantial
evidence to prove the required mental state.1 67 The defendant's state of mind
must be inferred from this evidence. Since there is considerable leeway in
making such inferences, the court may uphold a jury's punitive damage
award without clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard 68 if it
believes the publisher engaged in such blameworthy conduct as failing to
investigate,1 69 irresponsible reporting,170 or an intent to injure the plaintiff's
reputation. 171

166. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964); accord, St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (proof "that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication.").
167. 390 U.S. at 732; Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1026 (Sth Cir. 1975).
168. The New York Times standard requires proof of reckless disregard with "convincing
clarity." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964); Hotchner v. CastilloPuche, Civil No. 76-7479, at 2526 (2d Cir., March 23, 1977).
169. See Fopay v. Noveroske, 31 Ill. App. 3d 182, 196, 334 N.E.2d 79, 91 (1975). The
Supreme Court has expressly stated that failure to investigate does not establish liability under
the New York Times test. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Some courts,
however, have in effect required a duty to investigate by finding liability even though the
publisher relied on a reasonably trustworthy source. See Montandon v. Triangle Publications,
Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975), where punitive
damages were upheld even though the libelous statement originated in a press release composed
by a television producer. The producer was in a better position to know the facts than the editors
of the defendant publication, who relied on the press release and made only slight changes. 45
Cal. App. 3d at 941-42, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 188. Similarly, courts have found reckless disregard
when a newspaper printed letters to the editor containing defamation, Walker v. Colorado
Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 91-92, 538 P.2d 450, 453 (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975), and when telephone callers on a "call and comment" radio program uttered libelous
statements, Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., 251 So. 2d 405, 410-11 (La. App. 1971).
The Supreme Court had earlier reached a result inconsistent with the Snowden decision without
any discussion of the first amendment in a case construing the Federal Communications
Commission's Fairness Doctrine. The Court held a broadcaster is not liable for defamatory
remarks uttered by a political candidate using the broadcaster's facilities to exercise his right of
reply under the Fairness Doctrine. Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360
U.S. 525, 531-35 (1959).
170. See Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 949, 120 Cal. Rptr.
186, 193, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) ("While this result was apparently not intentional, it
was one which those responsible should have foreseen. .. ."); Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 IMl.
App. 3d 300, 304, 337 N.E.2d 443, 447 (1975) ("The existence of actual malice may be inferred
where a defamatory publication is made without the proper cause or excuse."). The Durso
decision relied on the responsible publisher standard set out in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967), which had been abandoned by the Supreme Court one year before
Durso was decided. See note 6 supra.
171. See Autobuses Internacionales S de R.L., Ltd. v. El Continental Publishing Co., 483
S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), where the key consideration in reversing summary judgment
for the defendant was that the newspaper had planned a campaign "to destroy [plaintiff's]
business by libelous articles." Id. at 509.
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A number of cases are illustrative. One court upheld punitive damages
where the publisher printed allegations that the public official plaintiff was
involved in a crime even though it is questionable whether the evidence
showed the publisher had substantial doubts of the truth of the allegation
when it was published. 172 In another case there was a history of bitter
political exchanges between the parties and it appeared the defendant might
have intentionally set out to injure the public figure plaintiff's reputation.17"
The court upheld a punitive damage award even though much of the evidence
indicated the defendant believed the statement to be true. 174 Another court
affirmed a jury's award of punitive damages to a public figure on little more
than an assertion that the publisher recklessly disregarded the truth of the
article. 175 The court placed more emphasis on facts showing the defendant
had a clear motive for libeling the plaintiff.' 7 6 In another case the confusion
172. See Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams, 336 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. App, 1976), where
$100,000 in punitive damages was upheld against a newspaper. The reporter had based his story
about political misconduct on five sources. However, at trial three of the sources contradicted the
reporter's testimony and denied they had given him any information. In finding actual malice had
been established, the court stressed the fact that the reporter had said he was going to "get " the
plaintiff and "put him in jail." Id. at 1199.
173. See Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 539 F.2d 882 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 785 (1977). Both the trial and appellate court devoted extensive
space to discussing the inflamatory opinions which the defendant published about the plaintiff,
394 F. Supp. at 923-24, 539 F.2d at 887, even though as opinions they were found not actionable.
539 F.2d at 895. Both courts noted the bitter exchanges between the parties prior to the
defamatory publication. 394 F. Supp. at 923, 539 F.2d at 887. The trial court, in fact, expressly
took this evidence of the defendant's motives into consideration in finding that reckless disregard
had been shown. 394 F. Supp. at 932. This was probably error, since the Supreme Court has
consistently stated that ill will, spite or intent to injure are not part of the New York Times test.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n. 18 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 9-11 (1970).
174. The defendant was charged with publishing an assertion that the plaintiff, a newspaper
columnist, practiced libelous journalism. There was evidence that the plaintiff had been sued In
the past for libel, and one suit against him had been successful. 539 F.2d at 896. In addition, the
defendant testified that he did not think any reader would interpret the allegedly libelous passage
to mean that the plaintiff lied in his news columns. He thought the reader would conclude Instead
that the plaintiff "goaded" people in his columns. There was evidence that the plaintiff had
attacked certain persons in print and thereby had "goaded" them. 394 F. Supp. at 939-40.
175. See Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 740 (1977). The allegedly libelous statement on which the court based its holding was
that the plaintiff had caused the proceeds from a fund raising drive to be "channeled to a special
bank account" that the plaintiff had opened. Id. at 1029. To demonstrate that the publisher knew
this was false, the court relied on evidence that the plaintiff did not know of plans to change bank
accounts until he was informed of it by "an employee" of the defendant publication. At that time
the plaintiff "expressed his opposition to the change." Id. The court concluded that "[t]his
testimony provides sufficient support for the jury's general finding that [defendant] published
[statements] with . . . reckless disregard for their truthfulness." Id.
176. The plaintiff and defendant had planned the fund raising campaign together, but they
had a "falling out." As a consequence the plaintiff set up a separate fund raising account. Shortly
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of the name of the plaintiff, a public official, with the name of an underworld
figure was held to be reckless disregard, even though the mistake was
reasonable and the two names differed only by middle initials. 1 77 There is
language in the opinion which suggests the punitive damage award was
upheld because the author had intentionally set out to tarnish the reputation
of public officials by linking them with organized crime.' 78 In these cases it
appears that the court relied more on evidence of the defendant's morally
blameworthy behavior in awarding punitive damages than on evidence that
the defamation was published with reckless disregard of truth.
The chilling effect of punitive damages is compounded by such results,
because non-meritorious suits are encouraged.' 7 9 Suits are sometimes filed
without even a pretense of proving actual damages, solely in the hope that the
jury will award sufficient punitive damages to make litigation worthwhile. 810
Other actions have been brought even though the plaintiffs had little hope of
proving knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.' 8 ' Such suits
are filed in hope that the publisher will settle rather than face the threat of
punitive damages in court. It is submitted that they would not have been filed
had the award of punitive damages been restricted beyond the requirements
of New York Times.
C.

Requirement of Intent to Injure in Public Figure
and Public Official Cases
The vast majority of the news media's daily output consists of routine facts
and opinions generated by public officials and other newsmakers who are
quoted in newspapers and on broadcast news programs.18 2 In such cases,
thereafter the defendant published two "uncomplimentary" news articles about the plaintiff. Id.
at 1028.
177. Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 33 Ill.
App. 3d 300, 337 N.E.2d 443 (1975). The court even
pointed out that it was not clear that the author was aware that there were two Thomas Dursos
when he wrote the book. Id. at 305, 337 N.E.2d at 447. The court admitted at one point that "the
publisher.. . had no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the statement regarding the plaintiff
." Id. at 302, 337 N.E.2d at 445.
178. Id. at 305, 337 N.E.2d at 447.
179. Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 170 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Libel plaintiffs
have few compunctions about asking for large punitive damage awards. E.g., Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976) (ten million dollars
requested).
180. Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 539 F.2d 882 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 785 (1977) (plaintiff presented "no evidence whatever" of injury
to his reputation).
181. See McCarney v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.,-Iowa, 239 N.W.2d 152,
156 (1976) ("There is a complete absence of any facts in the record before us from which a finding
of actual malice could be made.'); James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834, 386
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976). In the latter case it is doubtful the plaintiff entertained any strong hope of
proving publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth because she
herself had given the alleged defamatory statements to the newspaper reporter, who accurately
reported them.
182. The traditional role of the media has been the "objective presentation of information and
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where there is no intent to harm the individual quoted, the media should be
allowed maximum freedom in reporting the news. Compensatory damages to
public figures or public officials should be restricted to those libels published
with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, 18 3 and punitive
damages should not be awarded.
The media occasionally play a different role, however, when they campaign
against a political official and his policies. The objective reporter of facts and
opinions then seeks to influence the course of public events. 18 4 In some such
cases it might be possible for a plaintiff to prove that the publisher intentionally set out to injure his reputation. 8 5 The power of the media to injure an
individual's reputation is perhaps greatest in such cases. 18 6 If the publisher
opinion supplied by high-level official sources." B. Schmidt, Freedom of the Press vs. Public
Access 57 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schmidt]. Newspapers rely extensively on official sources
and fill their columns with factual information contained in press releases. Most journalists
convey the opinions of their news sources and make no attempt of their own to influence public
opinion. See Grant, The "New Journalism" We Need, 9 Colum. Journalism Rev., Spring 1970, at
12-13; Jones, Filling Up the White Space, 14 Colum. Journalism Rev., May/June 1975, at 10,
Wicker, The Greening of the Press, 10 Colum. Journalism Rev., May/June 1971, at 7. Substantial news coverage is given to such factual information as real estate, food, fashion and trade
news, weather and accident stories. See Bagdikian, Fat Newspapers and Slim Coverage, 12
Colum. Journalism Rev., Sept./Oct. 1973, at 15; Samuelson, Is It Time to Bury the Holiday
Death Watch?, 14 Colum. Journalism Rev., Nov./Dec. 1975, at 11. One study found 70 percent
of all weekday news items were used by more than one television network. Lemert, Content
Duplication by the Networks In Competing Evening Newscasts, 51 Journalism Q. 238 (1974). "It
appears as if the most routine, cut-and-dried stories were the ones which were covered by
everybody, and there weren't many other kinds of stories on the network news." Id. at 244.
183. In addition, it is submitted that the common-law presumption of damages should be
replaced by a requirement of proof of actual injury such as the Supreme Court now requires for
private figure plaintiffs. See notes 276-88 infra and accompanying text.
184. Some commentators predict the future will see an increase in investigative journalism.
See Schmidt, supra note 182, at 58-62. However, it is likely that the high cost of investigative
journalism will force publishers and broadcasters to continue to rely on official sources for the
majority of their news. Even on radio stations devoted entirely to news, "a reporter is almost
never sprung loose for investigative or enterprise reporting. At $20,000 a year and up, reporters
are too valuble to put on one story for three months. Few reporters are given the time even to
become specialists, to develop a beat, or to do occasional analysis of important local events or
trends." Powers & Oppenheim, The Failed Promise of All-News Radio, 12 Colum. Journalism
Rev., Sept./Oct. 1973, at 27.
185. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va), cert. denied,
423 U.S.882 (1975), where the evidence showed a newspaper made a "deliberate effort" to present
facts about a political candidate's financial transactions in a manner which would make them
appear improper. Id. at 690. The court found it was "the intent of the editors" to impugn the
plaintiff's integrity. Id. at 686.
186. The performance of the press during the Watergate scandal is perhaps the most
dramatic demonstration of the media's power when it campaigns against individual politicians.
See Potter Stewart on the Press: Not Merely a 'Neutral Conduit,' 13 Colum. Journalism Rev.,
Jan./Feb. 1975, at 38. The potential for injury to reputation is perhaps the greatest in the case of
television, which "has become the symbol of the media's mammoth power in the post-industrial
age." Schmidt, supra note 182, at 120. The recognition that an investigative journalism exposk on
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acted with both intent to injure and knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of the truth then punitive damages may be justified as a deterrent. But when
only one of these elements is present, punitive damages should be withheld as
a remedy on constitutional grounds. Such a result would allow a publisher to
campaign against a public official without fear of an arbitrary punitive
damage award as long as the publisher entertained no substantial doubts
about the truth of his articles.18 7 But in those few cases where a publisher
uses facts which he knows to be false or whose truth he substantially doubts
in an attempt to injure the reputation of a public figure or public official, then
punitive damages should be awarded as a deterrent. Punitive awards would
be reserved for the narrow area where both the New York Times elements and
intent to injure were present.
It is clear that there is no constitutional protection for a libel published with
both New York Times actual malice and intent to injure. Such a libel is
"calculated falsehood," which the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated never
enjoys first amendment protection. 188 The consistent use of the word "calculated" indicates the Court may have intended to distinquish this category of
speech from that encompassed by the New York Times test-speech published
with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.18 9 Calculated
falsehood implies something more than knowledge that speech is false. It
implies a scheme or plan to injure.
television would be significantly more damaging to an individual's reputation than a similar
newspaper report has no doubt influenced some libel decisions. In Credit Bureau v. CBS News,
332 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1971), for example, a television network compiled an investigative
report on the credit agency industry. Part of the broadcast was an interview with a high level
industry representative, who stated that activities engaged in by the plaintiff credit agency
violated industry guidelines. In fact, the spokesman misquoted the guidelines. Even though there
was no evidence that the network was aware of the mistake, the court found there was a jury
question whether or not the network published a libel
with reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at
1297-98. One explanation for this result could be that the court was reacting to the tremendous
harm such an accusation made by a national television network could do to a credit agency doing
business by mail.
187. Such activity by the news media is seen as a fundamental part of our political process.
While some Americans may have believed President Nixon was "hounded out of office" by the
press, for example, Justice Stewart asserted that the press was performing "precisely the function
it was intended to perform by those who wrote the First Amendment of our Constitution." Potter
Stewart on the Press: Not Merely a 'Neutral Conduit,' 13 Colum. Journalism Rev., JanJFeb.
1975, at 38.
188. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 389-90 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). The Court applied the
standard in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 (1974), an invasion of
privacy case. The reporter wrote a news feature about the plaintiff, fabricating details to make
her life appear destitute and attributing quotes to her and describing her face as "a mask of
non-expression" even though he had not interviewed her or seen her. Id. at 248. This action by
the reporter, which might have been described as reporting with intent to injure if it were a libel
case, was found to be "calculated falsehood" outside the area of constitutionally protected speech.
Id.at 253.
189. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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There is support in the cases for the assertion that punitive damages in libel

should be constitutionally conditioned on a showing that the publisher acted
with some form of intent to injure. The most explicit is Maheu v. Hughes Tool
Co., 190 which stated in a dictum that punitive damages could be awarded to
private figure plaintiffs only when the publisher exhibited "reprehensible
conduct that is motivated by ill will, or is accompanied by malice, fraud, or
oppression. "191 Similar language can be found in Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc.,192 where the court reversed an award of punitive damages to a
public figure on constitutional grounds. The court declined to hold punitive

damages unconstitutional in all cases, because such damages may be neces-

sary to deter "willful and reckless conduct" in some cases. 193 In Rosenbloom

Justice Harlan recognized that while punitive damages have a chilling effect
on the media, they still 194
have a limited place in libel law to deter "morally
blameworthy" behavior.
Maheu's test is nearly a restatement of the common-law rule of "malice"that punitive damages are awarded only on a showing of spite, ill will or an
intent to harm for its own sake. 1 95 Maheu elevated the requirement to
constitutional status by holding that when a publisher engages in such
reprehensible conduct he invades the plaintiff's right of privacy. In such a

case the courts must balance the right of privacy with first amendment
freedoms and an award of punitive damages is justified in spite of the chilling
effects it produces. 196
190. 384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
191. Id. at 172.
192. 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
193. Id. at 692. The court found the defendant newspaper had participated in a "plan or
scheme to discredit the character of a political candidate . . . ." Id. at 680. The fact that the
holding concerning punitive damages was framed in the traditional concepts of common-law
malice was critically noted at 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 247, 253 (1976).
194. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 73 (1971) (dissenting opinion). In his
earlier opinion, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), Justice Harlan endorsed the
idea that common-law malice should be required as a condition to an award of punitive damages.
He wrote that "punitive damages require a finding of 'ill will' under general libel law and it Is not
unjust that a publisher be forced to pay for the 'venting of his spleen' " with an award of punitive
damages. Id. at 161. In addition, Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) can
be read as impliedly approving a condition of common-law malice to an award of punitive
damages. In that case the trial court had allowed compensatory claims because actual malice had
been proven, but it dismissed the claims for punitive damages because common-law malice had
not been shown. Id. at 251-52. The court of appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 254.
195. The court defined the required showing for an award of punitive damages as "reprehensible conduct that is motivated by ill will, or is accompanied by malice, fraud, or oppression." 384
F. Supp. at 172 (footnote omitted). Note the similarity between this language and Prosser's
statement of conduct required at common law as a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages:
"aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive .... " Prosser,
supra note 15, § 2, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
196. 384 F. Supp. at 171-72. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491
(1975).
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It could be argued that an added requirement that a jury be instructed on
intent to injure with respect to the issue of punitive damages would introduce
an element of complexity into an area of law already burdened by too many
distinctions. 197 But an additional instruction that if the jury is to punish the
defendant it must find that he acted with intent to injure, is grasped easily
and can be applied almost intuitively. The Supreme Court was willing to
introduce a double jury instruction into private figure cases in Gertz, where it
allowed the states to permit liability on a negligence instruction but still
required the New York Times test for punitive damages. Any additional
complexity in public figure and public official cases would be justified by the
added protection a condition of proving intent gives to media threatened by
arbitrary awards of punitive damages.' 9 8
1.

Common-Law Malice

The result suggested above-that punitive damages be conditioned on a
showing that the publisher intended to harm the plaintiff-may be stated in
traditional common-law terms: before punitive damages are awarded in tort
cases "malice" must be shown. This requirement of common-law malice has
survived the extensive rewriting of libel law since New York Times, and it still
appears in the lower court libel cases. It indicates support for the proposition
that an additional requirement of intent to injure be added to the New York
Times liability requirements before punitive damages are awarded to public
figures or public officials.
There has been considerable confusion over the use of the term "malice" in
libel law. 199 The test adopted in New York Times-knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth-was characterized by the Court as a rule of
"actual malice. ' 20 0 This term was often confused with common-law malice,
which conditions an award of punitive damages on some showing of intent to
injure. 20 1 The basis of the distinction is that actual malice is a liability
standard which turns on the defendant's attitude toward the trth. Commonlaw malice is a description of certain aggravated behavior punishable with
damages and turns on the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff.20 2 It is
197. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 255 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("To make the First Amendment freedom to report the news turn on subtle differences
between common-law malice and actual malice is to stand the Amendment on its head."); Jacron
Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 593, 350 A.2d 688, 696 (1976); 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 247, 257-SB
(1976). Some of the confusion might be due merely to the similarity between the terms actual
malice and common-law malice. For an example of how confusing these terms can become see
Rush-Hampton Indus., Inc. v. Home Ventilating Institute, 419 F. Supp. 19, 22 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
Substituting the term intent to injure for malice in the common-law sense and instructing the jury
that it must find a spiteful intent to injure the plaintiff's reputation before awarding punitive
damages would resolve much of this confusion.
198. 418 U.S. at 347-50.
199. See Prosser, supra note 15, § 115, at 794; Eaton, supra note 12, at 1370 n.91.
200. 376 U.S. at 280.
201. Prosser, supra note 15, § 2, at 9.
202. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974); Carson v. Allied
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now well established that the two standards are distinct entities, 20 3 and the
proof of common-law malice as sufficient to
Supreme Court will not20accept
4
establish actual malice.
The Supreme Court's libel decisions may be read as abrogating the rule of
common-law malice and replacing it with actual malice. 205 Thus lower courts
often hold that evidence of actual malice will support an award of punitive
damages, 20 6 even though common-law malice was required at common law.
However, the state courts have been slow to put aside the common-law
concept. Some courts, rather than replacing common-law malice with actual
malice, have made actual malice an additional standard. 20 7 One court has
gone so far as to hold that evidence of common-law malice will "help prove"
News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976); see Williams v. Trust Co., 230 S.E.2d 45, 52 (Ga.
App. 1976).
203. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, -,
543 P.2d 1356, 1365
(1975); Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 252, 154 N.W.2d 409, 421-22 (1967) (common-law malice is
neither a substitute for actual malice nor "appropriate instruction as to the meaning of that
constitutional standard."); see Adams v.. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 363 (Wyo.
1976).
204. Letter Carriers Local 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81,
82 (1967) (per curiam).
205. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 395-96 (White, J., dissenting); see also
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 161 (1967), where the plurality opinion referred to
11illwill' [malice] under general libel law" as if it were a standard which had been eclipsed by the
constitutional test. Gertz could be read as suggesting that actual malice may eventually be set as
the standard for the recovery of presumed or punitive damages in private figure cases. See 418
U.S. at 350; Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 740 (1977) (concurring opinion); but see note 85 supra and accompanying
text.
206. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 93 (Okla. 1976); Fopay v. Noveroske, 31
Ill. App. 3d 182, 198, 334 N.E.2d 79, 92 (1975). The Illinois court qualified its holding, however,
by adding, "this is not to say that the States may not impose greater or additional tests [than
actual malice] as a condition to the recovery of punitive damages." Id. at 197, 334 N.E.2d at 92.
Some commentators have interpreted Gertz as replacing the common-law condition to awarding
punitive damages with a requirement that New York Times actual malice be shown. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 395-96 (1974) (White, J., dissenting); Comment, Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.: New Contours on the Libel Landscape, 5 N.Y.U. Rev. of L. & Social
Change 89, 105 (1976). The tendency of the courts to extend the actual malice standard into other
areas of libel law is demonstrated by cases such as Schulze v. Coykendall, 218 Kan. 653, 660-61,
545 P.2d 392, 398-99 (1976), which held actual malice will defeat a common-law privilege. See
Eaton, supra note 12, at 1441.
207. Thus, one court held that actual malice will defeat a common-law privilege, but It is
"not the exclusive test for abuse of a conditional privilege." Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md.
580, 600, 350 A.2d 688, 699 (1976) (punctuation omitted); see Eaton, supra note 12, at 1440.
Similarly, one court has held either actual malice or common-law malice will defeat a privilege.
Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 936, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 88 (1st Dist. 1975). See
also Sanborn v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 17 Cal. 3d -,
134 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405-06, 556 P.2d
764, 767-68 (1976) (applying common-law malice as a standard to defeat privilege); Eaton, supra
note 12, at 1371.
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208

actual malice.
Others apparently still require a showing of common-law
malice to support an award of punitive damages in libel. 20 9 Such cases
illustrate a consensus in the courts that actual malice is "less evil ' 210 than
common-law malice and less suitable as a standard for punishing the defendant.
Thus, if the concept of punishing speech retains any validity at all under
the first amendment, 21 1 then it is arguable that it should at least be conditioned upon a showing of intent to injure as defined by the common-law
malice cases.
2.

Public Person's Right of Privacy

When an individual becomes a public figure or a public official he subjects
21 2
himself to "closer public scrutiny" of his personal attributes and character.
Therefore his right to be free from unauthorized intrusion or prying by the
news media into his affairs is considerably less extensive than that of a private
figure, although he has not surrendered it completely. 21 3 If, for example, a
newspaper embarked on a campaign of publishing libels about a political
candidate in order to influence an election, it could be said the candidate's
privacy-his right to be let alone-had been invaded. Only in such rare cases,
when the publisher's "highly motivated, tortious conduct 2 1 4 constitutes an
unauthorized intrusion into the affairs of a public figure or public official, may
punitive damages be awarded
as a deterrent despite their chilling effect on
21 5
first amendment freedoms.
208. McFee v. Fleishman, Civil No. 45753, at 11 (Cal. CL App., Dec. 29, 1975), cert.
denied, 97 S. CL 309 (1976).
209. See Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1030 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. CL 740 (1977); Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
modified, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct., 785 (1977); Matthews v. Deland
State Bank, 334 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Wood v. Lee, 41 App. Div. 2d 730,
731, 341 N.Y.S.2d 738, 739 (1st Dep't 1973) (per curiam) (slander); cf. Bertot v. School Dist. No.
1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1185 (10th Cir. 1975) (refusing to impose penalty where it was not shown
"defendants acted with a malicious intention to cause a deprivation of [first amendment]
constitutional rights . . .
.
210. Kern v. News Syndicate Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 528, 244 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1963) (per
curiam).
211. See pt. I(A)(2) supra.
212. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
213. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301-02 & n.4 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
214. See Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166, 172 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
215. These were the facts in Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975). The court found the defendant newspaper had foresworn "its
role as an impartial reporter of facts" and participated in a "plan or scheme to discredit the
character of a political candidate . . . ." Id. at 680. Although the court reversed a $500,000
punitive damage verdict on constitutional grounds, it affirmed an award of $250,000 in presumed
damages on the ground they functioned as a deterrent to such "willful and reckless" defamation.
Id. at 692-93. Since there was no objective evidence of injury, it is possible that the jury used
presumed damages to punish the defendant. See notes 276-88 infra and accompanying text. Thus
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Such a result is suggested by the development of the tort of invasion of
privacy. The tort was literally created in 1890 by a pair of legal scholars who
reacted adversely to the "growing excesses of the press. 2 1 6 It developed into a
number of distinct branches, one of which involves "prying or intrusion" into
the affairs of the plaintiff.2 1 7 The cases which have held the tort of invasion of
privacy protects a fundamental right 2 18 have most often involved an unauthorized intrusion fact pattern. 21 9
In the intrusion cases the tort is often defined more with reference to the
behavior of the defendant than to the injured interest of the plaintiff. Often
the defendant's acts are highly reprehensible, 220 and no doubt this element of
Sprouse seems to have reached a result synonymous with the rule suggested here-when a
newspaper publishes libel with a spiteful intent to injure the plaintiff as well as with a reckless
disregard of the truth punitive damages may be awarded to even a public figure.
216. Prosser, supra note 15, § 117, at 802. The legal scholars, Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis, believed the policy which justified the creation of the tort was the protection of
individual reputations from the news media. "Of the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of
some such protection [as the right of privacy], there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press is
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no
longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effronte-y." Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193,
196 (1890).
217. Prosser, supra note 15, § 117, at 807-08. Originally the intrusion-type cases were limited
to invasions of the plaintiff's physical solitude. But the tort has expanded into other areas where
plaintiff's well being is disturbed by an intrusion into his private affairs. See id.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-652E (Tent. Draft No. 13, Apr. 27, 1967) defines the
four categories as unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of another, appropriation of another's
name or likeness; unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, and publicity which
unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public. See Prosser, supra note 15, § 117;
Comment, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Consumer Reports: Little Brother
is Watching You, 2 Hast. Const. L.Q. 773, 788-90 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Privacy].
218. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
219. See York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964)
(circulating photograph's of plaintiff's nude body among police officers); In re Long, 55 Cal. App.
3d 788, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 735 (3d Dist. 1976) (female observers in toilet and shower areas of
prison). The fact that some courts have found a fundamental right is involved on such fact
patterns is not surprising, since the concept of intrusion often appears in the constitutional right
of privacy cases. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 384, 453 (1972). One commentator has argued
that Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) is actually an intrusion type case. Note, Roe
and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1164-65 (1974). The Idea of
intrusion is central to the constitutional cases dealing with the privacy of the home. See Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("For also fundamental is the right to be free . . . from
unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy."); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alas.
1975) ("The privacy of the individual's home cannot be breached absent a persuasive showing of a
close and substantial relationship of the intrusion to a legitimate governmental interest."); see
United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743, 746-47 (D. Conn. 1973); Note, Roe and Paris: Does
Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1185 (1974).
220. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111-12, 206 A.2d 239, 241-42 (1964), where
a landlord installed a microphone in the bedroom of his tenant's apartment. Professor BIoustein
has argued that it is "the character of the interference" caused by the defendant which
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outrageousness has influenced some courts to find the plaintiffs interest
protected by the tort is a fundamental right.2 21 Galella v. Onassis2 2 2 is an
example. Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, who if she had sued for libel
would undoubtedly have been classified as a public figure, sued a photographer for invasion of privacy. A New York court held the photographer's
dogged pursuit of the plaintiff was so outrageous that he could be enjoined
22 3
from exercising his first amendment rights to gather news and photographs.
The key factor in the court's decision to infringe on the freedom of the press
in
224
the interest of privacy was the outrageousness of the defendant's acts.
This principle may be applied to libel. When the publisher's conduct is so
outrageous that it may be said he intentionally set out to injure the plaintiffs
reputation, then there has been an intrusion into the affairs of the plaintiff
which justifies the award of punitive damages in spite of their chilling effects
on the press. Punitive damages may be constitutionally awarded to public
figures and officials only in such narrow circumstances.
Such an analysis makes it clear why the New York Times test is too broad a
standard for awarding punitive damages in libel. It does not restrict the
award of punitive damages to the narrow case where the publisher's acts are
distinguishes invasion of privacy from other torts which insult human dignity. Bloustein, Privacy
as an Aspect of Human Dignity- An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 962, 1003
(1964). The "law of privacy attempts to preserve individuality by placing sanctions upon
outrageous or unreasonable violations of the conditions of its sustenance." Id.
One consideration in the Supreme Court's decision to recognize a right to privacy in the use of
contraceptives was the outrageous consequences which might follow: "Would we allow the police
to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
221. See, e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 301, 292 N.Y.S.2d S14 (Sup. Ct.
1968), aff'd, 31 App. Div. 2d 392, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1st Dep't 1969), afrd, 25 N.Y.2d 560, 307
N.Y.S.2d 647, 255 N.E.2d 765 (1970), where the defendant corporation hired women to attempt
to seduce one of its public critics, tapped his telephone, followed him and questioned his
acquaintances. The Supreme Court held there was a violation of "a constitutional right of
plaintiff to privacy-a right to be let alone." Id. at 305, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 518. The Court of
Appeals applied the law of another jurisdiction which recognized a narrow right of privacy
action, 25 N.Y.2d at 565-67, 255 N.E.2d at 768-69, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 651-53, and therefore did
not reach the constitutional issue raised by the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals, however,
did recognize that aggravated conduct by the defendant was an element of the tort. It held that
the mere observation of plaintiff was not actionable, but if the observation were "overzealous" it
would constitute an invasion of privacy. 25 N.Y.2d at 570, 255 N.E.2d at 771, 307 N.Y.S.2d at
655.
222. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
223. Id. at 223-24. "He was like a shadow: everywhere she went he followed her and engaged
in offensive conduct; nothing was sacred to him .... " Id. at 210. The Second Circuit based its
decision on a violation of New York's criminal harassment statute. 487 F.2d at 994-95.
However, the court indicated that if there had been no such statute available it would have
allowed the case to turn on an invasion of the right of privacy, which it suggested was a
constitutional right. Id. at 995 n.12.
224. 353 F. Supp. at 207-14.
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so outrageous that they constitute an invasion of the right to be free from
aggravated intrusion. Even though he knew a statement was false or published it with reckless disregard for the truth, the defendant might not have
spitefully intended to injure the plaintiffs reputation. An award of punitive
damages conditioned only on the requirements of New York Times would not
225
narrowly reach the conduct intended to be deterred. A more sensitive tool,
such as the additional condition of proving an intent to harm, is required.
III. SMALL AND SPECIALIZED MEDIA
The objections to punitive damages apply with particular force in the case
of small media such as weekly newspapers, special interest226magazines or small
and Congress22 7
audience broadcast stations. Both the Supreme Court
have in a certain sense recognized that small or financially ailing media might
need special protection, but the Court has been reluctant to introduce
economic arguments into first amendment law. 228 Lower courts have recognized, however, that the burden of damages is greater on small media. 229 In
fact, the harshness of punitive damage awards on small publishers has been
225.

Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) ("The separation of legitimate from

illegitimate speech calls for . . . sensitive tools . . .
226. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 610 & n.40 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-51 (1974); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969); cf. Linn. v. Plant Guard Workers Local
114, 383 U.S. 53, 64 (1966).
227. See the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1970), in which
Congress, in effect, sanctioned newspaper monopolies in certain cities in the interest of keeping
failing papers from going out of business.
228. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam) ("The First Amendment's
protection against governmental abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to
depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public discussion.'); but see Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), where the Court
allowed first amendment protection to turn on economic considerations by recognizing that speech
which can afford to pay its own way is not entitled to as much protection as speech which is not
"purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54. But see Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the
Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 41 & n.143 (1976), which asserts the Court has
apparently abandoned the commercial speech doctrine.
Especially where minority rights have been involved, the Court has allowed economic factors
to enter into consideration of first amendment problems. See Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945), where it suggested a power exists in the first amendment which allows
Congress to promote the "free flow of ideas" by enforcing antitrust laws against exclusive media
combinations. Id. at 20. In Buckley, the Court had no problem finding the power under the
Constitution to grant special exemptions from contribution disclosure requirements to minor
political parties which can demonstrate that such disclosure would result in a decrease In
contributions. 424 U.S. at 73-74 (dicta).
229. E.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1011 (1967) ("All persons who desire to exercise their right to criticize public officials are
not as well equipped financially as the Post. . . 2"); cf. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 897 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 785 (1977); Smoot v. League of Women Voters, 36 F.R.D. 4, 5
n.1 (W.D Mich. 1964).
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cited as a reason why such damages should be held unconstitutional. 230 Such
concern merits 23
a 1closer look at small media and the effect punitive damages
have on them.
There is no doubt that small and specialized media are an important part of
the mass communications industry. Of the 11,400 newspapers published in
the United States in 1975, there were 8,824 weeklies 232 with a combined
circulation in excess of 26 million. 233 Suburban newspapers in the top ten
markets increased in circulation by 80 per cent from 1945 to 1968, compared
with an increase of 2 per cent for metropolitan dailies. 2 34 The number of FM
radio stations, many of which are independently owned, has increased rapidly
since 1950.235 The growth of small media reflects a trend toward specialization. National magazines such as Look and Life have gone out of business,
and national radio networks no longer dominate local programming. 236 There
are also indications that small media serving specialized 23
markets
will continue
7
to grow more rapidly than the mass audience media.
230. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is
perhaps noteworthy that one of the first cases to enunciate the rationale that punitive damages
have a chilling effect on the media involved a bi-weekly special interest newspaper with a
circulation of from 11,000 to 12,000. See Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649,
662 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en banc).
231. Perhaps because large newspapers and broadcasters are more attractive defendants,
there are relatively few reported cases dealing with small media defendants and fewer still in
which punitive damages are an issue. In 1976, for example, only three cases arguably dealing

with small media defendants were reported in the federal circuit courts, and only one of them
dealt with punitive damages. Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, Inc., 542 F.2d 638, 639 (4th
Cir. 1976) (publisher of Detective Cases, apparently a monthly magazine); Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. CL 785 (1977J
(punitive damages against a monthly special interest magazine); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529
F.2d 206, 208 (7th Cir. 1976) (tabloid periodical). It cannot be concluded that the relative scarcity
of reported cases means that the threat of libel does not induce self-censorship on the part of small
media. It might be, for example, that the lack of cases is explained by a tendency of small media
defendants to settle rather than to face the costs of litigation. In addition, the fact that even three
libel suits reached the federal circuit courts in 1976 might cause a small publisher to pull back on
the reins of his criticism of public officials or treatment of controversial issues.
232. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1975, at 522
(96th ed. 1975). The number of newspapers from 1950 to 1975 has actually decreased. The
number of periodicals, on the other hand, has increased from 6,960 to 9,657 from 1950 to 1975,
with the greatest increases in the less frequently published periodicals. For example, while
weeklies increased from 1,443 to 1,918, monthlies increased from 3,694 to 4,087 and bimonthlies
increased from 436 to 1,009. Id.
233. An article published in 1968 estimated the combined circulation of 8,000 weeklies in the
United States at 26 million. The Irrepressible Weeklies, 7 Colum. Journalism Rev., Summer
1968, at 30.
234. Schmidt, supra note 182, at 40.
235. Sterling, Trends in Daily Newspaper and Broadcast Ownership, 1922-1970, 52 Journalism Q. 247, 252-53 (1975).
236. Maisel, The Decline of Mass Media, 37 Pub. Opinion Q. 159, 167 (1973).
237. See id. at 159-61, where the author asserts that the growing demand for specialized
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The statistics on the rapid growth of monopoly in the mass media,
however, have overshadowed the importance of smaller publications in the
eyes of the courts. The trend toward common ownership of newspaper chains
and television networks has created a backlash against the expanding protection of the media under the first amendment. 238 Justice White concluded that
the deterrent effect of libel law is a necessary check on the "awesome power"
'239
which media conglomerates have "placed in the hands of a select few.
However, researchers have found that the growth of media ownership chains
has been accompanied by a corresponding growth in the number of smaller
media outlets. 240 Even when adjustments for ownership have been made,
research indicates that there are still more independent media "voices" than at
241
any time in the past.
A. Small Media and Punitive Damages
The objections to the arbitrary amounts of punitive damage awards have
more force in the case of small publications, which would be less able to
absorb a large judgment than, for example, a metropolitan newspaper
chain. 242 The danger that an award of punitive damages may put a publisher
media reflects the growth of the service industries. As the economy continues to shift from a
manufacturing and industrial stage toward a service-oriented phase, Maisel believes the demand
for specialized media will increase. He predicts specialized media will eventually replace the mass
media. See also J. Merrill & R. Lowenstein, Media, Message and Man 33-44 (1971).
238. Justice White's opinions are the most notable examples of this attitude on the Supreme
Court. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263 (1974) (concurring
opinion) ("To me it is a near absurdity.., to leave the people at the complete mercy of the press,
at least in this stage of our history when the press . . . is steadily becoming more powerful and
much less likely to be deterred by threats of libel suits."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 402 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Some commentators have concluded that media monopoly
has made the concept of the marketplace of ideas an anachronism. See Barron, Access to the
Press---A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1647-48 (1967); Kelly, Criminal
Libel and Free Speech, 6 U. Kan. L. Rev. 295, 330-31 (1958).
239. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 402 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Newspaper
ownership has concentrated to the point where in 1968 single owners controlled newspapers In 95
per cent of American cities. In 1974 there were 60 American cities in which the monopoly
newspaper owned a television station in the same city. In 250 cities in 1967 broadcast stations
were controlled by local dally newspapers. Schmidt, supra note 182, at 40-41.
240. See Sterling, Trends in Daily Newspaper and Broadcast Ownership, 1922-1970, 52
Journalism Q. 247, 252-54 (1975). There has been a steady increase in the ratio of independent
broadcast stations to multiply owned stations from 1950 to 1970. See id. at 254 & Table 3. The
author projects, however, that this trend may be reversed after 1980. Id. at 254. In addition,
since 1970 the historic decline in the number of large metropolitan daily newspapers has been
offset by the rapid growth of suburban newspapers. Id. at 252.
241. Id. The study collected data on both media outlets and media "voices"-a voice being an
owner who controlled one or more media outlets in a given market. Generally the increase In
media outlets outpaced the increase in media voices, indicating a concentration in ownership. But
the growth of new FM radio and television markets and the suburban press was so great that the
authors were unable to claim support for their hypothesis that media ownership has become more
concentrated since 1950. Id. at 249, 252-53.
242. A 1973 study showed half of all publications and broadcasters did not have libel
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out of business is strongest in the case of small media. 243 In addition, the
courts have recognized that small media such as minority political publications2 44 or "underground" newspapers 245 are often vehicles which provide

alternative viewpoints. Public opinion researchers have been able to measure
the difference in viewpoints offered by smaller or independent media outlets. 246 Unpopular opinions are more likely to be circulated by small media
insurance. "Many of those who are not covered are those who need insurance most: new
magazines, 'alternative' newspapers, and unconventional broadcasters." Anderson, The Selective
Impact of Libel Law, 14 Colum. Journalism Rev., May/June 1975, at 42. Before a Bermuda
insurance company entered the field in 1963 there was no insurance which the publishing industry
considered adequate against punitive damages for libel. It was not until 1972 that such a policy
was offered to weekly newspapers not owned by the American Newspapers Publishers Association. See Editor & Publisher, Nov. 2, 1974, at 11.
243. See Anderson, The Selective Impact of Libel Law, 14 Colum. Journalism Rev.,
May/June 1975, at 38. Smaller publications and "less conventional media voices . . . face a
dilemma. If they are to survive, they must attract attention; to do that, they must tackle subjects
not being covered by the established news organizations. In short, they must take risks. On the
other hand, because of their financial insecurity, a libel suit, even though ultimately unsuccessful,
would probably be fatal." Id. After spending three years litigating a libel action and winning, the
editor of a medium-sized daily newspaper was quoted as saying, "If the.., suit had been against
a smaller and less financially-able newspaper, the costs of defending its basic right would have
forced that newspaper out of business." Editor & Publisher, April 25, 1964, at 48. See also N.Y.
Times, Oct. 21, 1976, at 79, col. 3, for an account of how "a newspaper [was] strangled by
litigation." Similar considerations apparently played a central role in the decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia to hold punitive damages in libel actions unconstitutional. See
Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882
(1975). The court found that when an award of punitive damages might "jeopardize the existence
of a newspaper" it violates the first amendment. Id. at 692. It found the punitive damage award
involved was a repressive deterrent to the free press, "[p]articularly in West Virginia, where a
large portion of the State is served by newspapers which lack substantial financial assets.. . ." Id.
at 690.
The Supreme Court recognizes that a state policy which discriminates on the basis of wealth is
more constitutionally suspect in the case where the policy results in a complete deprivation of an
important right. Such deprivation is more likely to be unconstitutional than a case where "equal
protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on whom designated fines impose
heavier burdens." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22 (1973). Thus the fact
that arbitrary punitive damage verdicts not only impose a proportionately heavier burden on
small media defendants but actually threaten "an absolute deprivation of" first amendment
freedoms make such awards increasingly suspect. See id. at 23. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 522 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
244. Long v. Anaheim, 255 Cal. App. 2d 191, 198-99, 63 Cal. Rptr. 56, 61 (4th Dist. 1967)
(The court refused to apply a non-discriminatory license tax to a non-profit political weekly
newspaper whose "primary function . . . is to present the views of the Socialist Party to the
paper's subscribers. . . .'); cf. Quad-City Community News Service, Inc. v.Jebens, 334 F. Supp.
8, 17 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
245. United States v. Head, 317 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. La. 1970). In dismissing an obscenity
indictment against an underground radical newspaper the court stressed that the paper was
devoted to news reports, ideas and poetry and sought "to challenge, and to advocate departures
from, the style of life now socially accepted by the nation's middle class." Id. at 1144.
246. See Nestvold, Diversity in Local Television News, 17 J. Broadcasting 345 (1973) (finding
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than by large communications networks, which at least some commentators
have argued must be "centrist" in their opinions to avoid alienating part of the
market they provide for their advertisers. 247 If this is so, the power inherent
in punitive damages to punish unpopular opinions is especially threatening to
248
smaller media.
Proponents of punitive damages argue that an arbitrary award will be
corrected through judicial supervision. However, this argument is grounded
in the faith that few judges will share a jury's predisposition to punish
unpopular opinion. Small media have not always been treated charitably by
public officials 249 or by the courts.250 And when damages must be adjusted to
the sensitive requirements of the first amendment one might, to borrow a
phrase from Justice Powell, "doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the
conscience of judges. 25 1

It might also be said in defense of punitive damages that they may be
adjusted to the size of the defendant under common-law rules of evidence in
more potential diversity in news on television stations not affiliated with networks than on those
which are so affiliated); Tichenor & Wackman, Mass Media and Community Public Opinion, 16
Am. Behavioral Scientist 593 (1973) (finding readers of suburban weekly newspapers have been
shown to have different opinions on the same current issue than readers of metropolitan dailies
serving the same area).
247. See Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A
Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 81-82 (1973); accord, Barron, Access to tile
Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1661-63 (1967).
248. The fear of libel suits has been especially acute among operators of cable television
channels. "These... fears, along with responsibilities for some control over access programming
imposed by the [Federal Communications] Commission, have led cable operators to impose
prescreening requirements, indemnification agreements, and other potentially restrictive controls." Schmidt, supra note 182, at 211.
249. See Forcade v. Knight, 416 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1976) (underground press service
reporter arbitrarily denied passes for White House press briefings); Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); Quad-City
Community News Serv., Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Iowa 1971) (underground
bi-weekly newspaper with less than $10 in assets consistently denied access to police records
which large media reporters were routinely allowed to examine); cf. Watson v. Cronin, 384 F.
Supp. 652 (D. Colo. 1974).
250. See Freedman v. State Police, 135 N.J. Super. 297, 343 A.2d 148 (1975) for one court's
thinly disguised distaste for a small nonestablishment university newspaper. Large awards of
punitive damages are often routinely upheld against small defendants. See, e.g., Davis v.
Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 732-33, 737-38 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ($1,500 in punitive damages based on $1
nominal damages against a freelance investigative journalist); Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d
324, 328 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970) ($1 actual and $75,000 punitive
damages against small magazine and its publisher); Soderberg v. Halver, 276 Minn. 315, 316, 150
N.W.2d 27, 28 (1967) (holding that a "mimeographed circular" published at regular intervals and
mailed to residents of a Minnesota village was a newspaper and subject to liability for punitive
damages).
251. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). The quote is taken from the
discussion of an analogous question of whether or not the courts should be allowed to decide on
an ad hoc basis whether the facts before them fit the Rosenbloom public interest test.
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libel. Since evidence of the defendant's wealth is admissible on the issue of
punitive damages, 25 2 in theory a jury would find that a smaller award would
suffice as a deterrent against a small publisher. The rules for actual damages,
upon which punitive damages are predicated, operate in a similar way.
Evidence of the circulation of the defamatory statements can be admitted 5to3
allow the jury to calculate the extent of the injury to plaintiffs reputation.2
Evidence of the power or prestige of a source of defamation can be admitted
on the theory that defamation from an unknown source would cause little or
no injury.2 5 4 These rules on circulation and influence of a source may be of
less use in future private figure libel cases, however, since Gertz now requires
actual injury be proven with "competent evidence."25 5 The rule allowing
evidence of wealth may, in addition, inflame the jury.2 5 6 A small media
defendant might hesitate to introduce evidence of his assets for fear the jury
might regard the figures merely as money from which it may draw the
damage award. These rules are seldom applied, and even when they are the
result often seems to be no less arbitrary.25 7 From the point of view of small
media defendants, then, the utility of these rules might be questioned.
252. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
253. Collins v. Brown, 268 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D.D.C. 1967) (slander judgment reduced by
$20,000 because circulation of statement not as harmful as circulation by newspapers, television
or radio); McCormick, supra note 84, § 117, at 426.
254. See Kennedy v. Item Co., 213 La. 347,374, 34 So. 2d 886, 895 (1948); McCormick, supra
note 84, § 117, at 429; cf. Campanella v. Pursley, 25 Misc. 2d 54, 57, 202 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542
(Sup. CL 1960) (readers may not rely on a small weekly newspaper).
255. 418 U.S. at 350. These common-law rules required the jury to make an inference of
injury from facts about the size or influence of the source. But the reason Gertz required proof of
actual injury was that the Court was dissatisfied with the discretion vested in the jury under the
common-law rules of libel damages. Id. at 349. Such inferences may thus no longer be
permissible. An example of what the Court meant by competent evidence was the evidence of
emotional injury in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460-61 (1976).
256. McCormick, supra note 84, § 118, at 432; Morris, supra note 92, at 1209. Accordingly,
when the rule is cited it is usually in the context of justifying a large award of punitive damages.
See Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 181-82, 188 N.W.2d 494, 498-99 (1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 934 (1972) (punitive damage award of $75,000 supported on evidence that defendant had
assets of between 2 and 2.5 million dollars); Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 53
(Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 513 (1964) (no error to admit evidence of defendant's wealth
in $50,000 punitive damage case). One problem with the rules allowing evidence of defendant's
wealth, circulation or influence is that there are no objective standards for comparison. For
example, one court stated that a newspaper circulation of 15,000 was "widespread publication
...
properly to be considered by the jury in arriving at the amount of the award," Rogers v.
Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 576, 106 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1958). However, circulation of
15,000 is small in terms of most daily newspapers.
257. See Collins v. Brown, 268 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D.D.C. 1967) (slander); Greenberg v.
DeSalvo, 216 So. 2d 638, 643 (La. App. 1968), modified, 229 So. 2d 83 (Sup. CL 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1075 (1970) (increasing award); Fawcett Publications. Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d
42, 53 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 513 (1964) (wealth); Rogers v. Florence Printing Co.,
233 S.C. 567, 576, 106 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1958) (circulation).
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B. A Solution: Small Media Public Figures
Public figures in small media cases are often defined with reference to the
special characteristics of the media outlet. The courts may use circulation or
the boundaries of the community served by the publication as a guideline. A
high school principal is a public figure with respect to the high school
newspaper. 25 8 Teachers are public figures when they file a libel action against
a newsletter distributed to the academic community. 259 When two college
professors took vocal stands during a campus dispute concerning the use of
books by black authors, it was held they had become public
figures for the
260
limited purpose of suing the college newspaper for libel.
The same approach is taken in cases involving specialized media defendants. If the plaintiff has thrust himself to the forefront of a controversy
surrounding a certain topic, then he is a public figure for the purposes of a
libel action against the small media defendant which generally covers that
subject. When an individual organized a drive to change federal regulations
affecting the trucking industry, he was treated as a public figure in a suit
against Overdrive, a monthly magazine for truckers. 261 An opponent of
fluoridation of water supplies, who had lectured and written on the subject,
was a public figure in a suit against a medical journal which published an
article on fluoridation.2 62 Such treatment of the public figure question allows
specialized media maximum freedom in reporting developments in the area of
their expertise, because the plaintiff must meet the New York Times test to
recover for libel.
This method of classification could offer a solution to the small media
problem, depending on which rule the Supreme Court eventually adopts for
awarding punitive damages. The most desirable rule would be that punitive
damages are unconstitutional in public figure or public official cases absent
258. Bright v. Unified School Dist., 124 Cal. Rptr. 598, 604 (2d Dist. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 18 Cal. 3d 450, 556 P.2d 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1977).
259. Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1974).
260. Johnson v. Board of Junior College Dist., 31 Iil. App. 3d 270, 276 & n.1, 334 N.E.2d
442, 447 & n.1 (1975).
261. Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026, 1029 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 740 (1977).
262. Exner v. American Medical Ass'n, 12 Wash. App. 215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974); accord,
Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 941, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) (author and television personality a public figure for a libel suit
against TV Guide).
See Adey v. United Action for Animals, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) , cert. denied,
419 U.S. 842 (1974), where the plaintiff was a researcher at the University of California and a
consultant to the government space program which put a monkey into orbit. He sued the
publishers of a newsletter dealing with the "alternatives to the use of animals in research" which
had a circulation of 3,000. Id. at 464. The court classified the plaintiff as a public official on the
basis of his position as a government consultant. Id. at 461-62. The case could be put on a
sounder basis, however, if the plaintiff were classified as a small media public figure with respect
to the newsletter since he had published papers dealing with experiments on animals. See Id. at
464-65.
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intent to injure. 263 Punitive damages would then generally be allowed only in
suits by private figures. Under the classification system of the above small
media cases, however, it would be possible for a given individual to be
treated as a private figure in a suit against a television network and as a
public figure in a suit against a weekly newspaper serving his neighborhood.
Thus, in the suit against the television network, the individual could recover
punitive damages, provided he met the New York Times requirements. But
the same individual would not be able to recover any punitive damages in a
suit against the small media defendant newspaper absent intent to injure on
the part of the publisher. This is the desired result. It offers maximum
protection to small media defendants from the chilling effects of punitive
damages. It also preserves punitive damages as a deterrent for those cases
where a media conglomerate abuses its position of power and recklessly libels
a private figure plaintiff. For purposes of a suit against a large national media
defendant all persons except the very prominent and nationally known would
be classified as private figures.
The application of these rules can be illustrated with the facts in Time, Inc.
v. Firestone.2626sThe plaintiff was a prominent member of the Palm Beach
"sporting set"
and the wife of a wealthy industrialist. 266 She sued a
national publication, Time magazine, for falsely reporting that her divorce
was granted on grounds of adultery. The Supreme Court held that Mrs.
Firestone was a private figure for the purposes of the suit, noting that she "did
not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than
perhaps Palm Beach society .... "267 However, the result might have been
different if Mrs. Firestone had sued the Palm Beach News, which at the time
the Supreme Court heard arguments was a bi-weekly publication with a
circulation of 2,932.268 In that case she might well have been classified as a
public figure because of the prominent role she had chosen to play in Palm
Beach society. Thus under the rule of punitive damages suggested here, the
local weekly newspaper would enjoy greater protection from punitive dam269
ages than the national news magazine.
263. See notes 182-255 supra and accompanying text.
264. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
265. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 450.
267. Id. at 453.
268. See Editor & Publisher International Yearbook 62 (1975).
269. The facts in Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 423 F. Supp. S16 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) may illustrate the same analysis in the case of a specialized media defendant. The three

plaintiffs in the case were professors of biology, biochemistry and entomology at different
universities. None of them had achieved national fame outside the academic sphere, but all three
had published scientific articles dealing with the effects of DDT on bird life. The two codefendants were the publishers of a specialized environmental journal, "American Birds," and a
large metropolitan newspaper, The New York Times. The plaintiffs were found to be public
figures for both actions. Id. at 517. However, the better result would have been to treat the
plaintiffs as public figures with respect to "American Birds" and as private figures with respect to
The New York Times. Under the punitive damage rule suggested here, plaintiffs then could not
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Defining public figures with respect to media size and subject, when
coupled with a rule that punitive damages are unconstitutional in the ordinary
public figure or public official case, accomplishes two desired results. First, it
allows the media maximum freedom from the chilling effects of punitive
damages when they report on the affairs of public figures and officials. The
large national media, however, will be protected from punitive damages only
when they cover the affairs of those public figures who are truly nationally
known. Thus the potential for media conglomerates to abuse their power is
held in check by the threat of punitive damages if they stray from the field of
national interest. Second, the rules suggested here give small media additional
protection by classifying locally prominent persons as public figures, thus
barring their recovery of punitive damages absent an intent to injure. Since
small media will play an increasingly important role in the circulation of
diverse opinion, this solution is consistent with the first amendment policy of
fostering "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 270 public debate.
IV. CONCLUSION
The conflicting interests involved in the award of punitive damages for libel
may be balanced by restricting their award to private figure cases, 27 1 except
in the rare case where a publisher intends to harm the plaintiff with the
knowing or reckless publication of defamatory falsehoods. 272 This would
allow the media maximum freedom when covering public figures and public
officials, the plaintiffs who are most often involved in important public
debate. Furthermore, if public figures are defined with respect to the circulation and specialized topic covered by the defendant media outlet, persons who
could not command national attention but who had achieved prominence in
local affairs, would be classified as public figures if they were libeled by the
local small media. Since punitive damages would be severely restricted in
public figure cases, the end result would be greater protection for small
273
media.
Punitive damages should not, however, be abandoned in all public figure
and public official cases. They should be restricted to those few cases where
the plaintiff can prove that the publisher circulated defamatory falsehood
with a spiteful intent to injure the plaintiff's reputation. 274 Only in such a case
275
is the deterrent function of punitive damages a legitimate state interest.
Thus, a showing of intent to injure the plaintiff's reputation should be
required in addition to the New York Times liability requirements before
punitive damages are awarded to public figures or public officials.
recover a punitive award against the small media defendant "American Birds" absent an intent to
harm. But if they could show that The New York Times had libeled them with knowing falsity
or reckless disregard of the truth, they could recover punitive damages as private figures.
270. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
271. See pt. II(A) supra.
272. See pt. II(C) supra.
273. See pt. III(B) supra.
274. See pt. IIH(C)(1) supra.
275. See pt. IIm(C)(2) supra.
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One caveat must be added. If restrictions on the award of punitive damages
in public figure and public official cases are to be effective, the jury must be
prevented from using the common-law presumption of damages2 7 6 to return
an award which is punitive in nature but compensatory in name. It is clear
from a number of cases that presumed "actual" damages often play a role
indistinguishable from those of punitive damages. 7 7 As early as 1899 Justice
Peckham wrote that in libel cases "the line between compensatory and
punitive damages is quite vague .... ,"27 Cases may be found which treat the
concepts of punitive and compensatory damages interchangeably. 27 9 Thus
even if punitive damages were prohibited on constitutional grounds, an award
of presumed damages2 0by a jury reacting to unpopular opinion would frequently be affirmed.
The common-law rule of presumed damages has been of central concern in
the Supreme Court's attempt to promote the policies of the first amendment.
In New York Times the Court clearly disapproved of the fact that a $500,000
verdict had been returned by a jury which had seen no evidence of actual
injury. 28 1 But the Court did not disturb the common-law presumption until a
276. See notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
277. One of the most striking examples is a case in which the same facts were tried before
three different juries in three different counties. Only two of the juries were instructed that they
could award punitive damages, yet all three juries returned identical damage verdicts of $4,500.
See Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874); 39 Wis. 636 (1876); 42 Wis. 654, 671-72
(1877). One interpretation is that the punitive damages awarded by the first and third juries were
awarded in the guise of compensatory damages by the second. See also Farrar v. Tribune
Publishing Co., 57 Wash. 2d 549, 358 P.2d 792 (1961) (en banc), where the court allowed
evidence of lack of malice to be admitted to mitigate damages even though Washington is one of
the states which does not recognize the doctrine of punitive damages. 57 Wash. 2d at 556-57, 358
P.2d at 796-97. A dissent argued that only punitive damages can be mitigated by a showing of
good faith. 57 Wash. 2d at 562, 358 P.2d at 800 (dissenting opinion). Apparently the majority
believed compensatory damages might be used for punishment by the jury.
278. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 555 (1899). Justice Peckham was
not convinced that a jury would be prevented from punishing the defendant with an award of
damages merely because the trial judge had instructed that a punitive damage verdict could not
be returned. He concluded that if a jury was intent on punishing the defendant, it had sufficient
tools to accomplish its end with the presumption of injury. See id.
279. See Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, Civil No. 74-5516 (S.D.N.Y., July 30, 1976), revd on
other grounds, Civil No. 76-7479 (2d Cir., March 23, 1977), where to justify a large punitive
damage verdict based on only one dollar in compensatory damages, the court simply concluded
that the jury "[u]ndoubtedly. . . intended the punitive award to do double duty .... " Id. at S.
280. Such a result is possible in states where punitive damages have been held unconstitutional in libel actions but the common-law presumption of conpensatory damages has been
allowed to remain. See Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, -,
546 P.2d 81,
86 (1976) (en banc); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 692-93 (W. Va.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975). In the Sprouse case $250,000 in "actual damages" was upheld
although no proof in dollar amounts was offered because it was assumed a plaintiff with this
"rank and station in life" must have suffered that much emotional damage. Id.
281. See 376 U.S. at 270-77. Large compensatory awards, of course, have as much deterrent
effect as large punitive damage awards. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 83 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Stevenson v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 214 F.2d 902, 908 n.2
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labor dispute case, 28 2 in which it required that proof of injury must be offered
before any recovery of damages for libel could be granted. 28 3 These cases led
a number of lower courts to conclude that the first amendment prohibited
juries from presuming damages in libel. 28 4 Other courts, however, rejected
such a notion. 28 5 Finally, in Gertz, the Supreme Court held that in private
figure cases, at least when the New York Times test is not satisfied, there must
be "competent evidence" of "actual injury" before damages will be
awarded. 28 6 This rule prevents a jury from awarding damages which are
punitive in nature although labeled compensatory. 28 7 If constitutional restrictions on the award of punitive damages are to be successful, the rule in Gertz
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 874 (1954). The mere fact that compensatory damages are taken
from the defendant gives them an "admonitory function." Morris, supra note 92, at 1177. In
reducing grossly excessive compensatory verdicts in libel cases, courts occasionally Intimate that
the jury was using the verdict for punishment. See Walker v. Associated Press, 191 So. 2d 727,
739 (La. Ct. App. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 28 (1967).
282. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). The Court required proof
of actual injury but provided no discussion of the policy behind establishing such a rule. Id. at
64-65.
283. Id. It was also apparent that the holding would be limited to libels committed during the
course of labor disputes, where Congress and the courts have taken extra pains to ensure debate
continues unrestrained. Branch 496, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 270-72 (1974); Linn
v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 60-63 (1966); see Cafeteria Local 302 v. Angelos,
320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943). See also the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970), which guarantees the right of union members to voice their opinions at
meetings.
284. See Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, Inc., 84 111. App. 2d 239, 228 N.E.2d 172
(1967), aff'd on other grounds, 40 Il. 2d 32, 240 N.E.2d 1 (1968); Lundstrom v. Winnebago
Newspapers, Inc., 58 Ill. App. 2d 33, 206 N.E.2d 525 (1965); cf. McNabb v. Tennessean
Newspapers, Inc., 55 Tenn. App. 380, 400 S.W.2d 871 (1965) (en banc).
285. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 340 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049
(1970); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 256-57, 259 N.E.2d 651, 667-68,
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970); Fox v. Kahn, 421 Pa. 563, 569, 221 A.2d 181, 184, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
286. 418 U.S. at 350. Prosser lists two additional reasons why libel damages should be limited
to actual injury. It would "go far to do away with the genuine evils of the petty spite suit for
trivial utterances, and the serious abuse of the action of defamation as a weapon of extortion."
Prosser, supra note 15, § 112, at 765.
287. Some authorities, however, would dispute this assertion on the ground that by including
mental anguish and suffering in the list of actual injury in Gertz, the Supreme Court defeated the
very principles it sought to protect. See Eaton, supra note 12, at 1436; Comment, Defamation
Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Impact on State Law and the First
Amendment, 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 960, 982 (1975); Note, Federalization of State Defamation Law,
15 Washburn L.J. 290, 304 (1976); cf. Developments, supra note 21, at 138-39.
It has been suggested that the mental distress damage category provides a "formidable weapon"
to a jury inclined to punish unpopular opinion, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and that it is a return to the common-law rule of presumed
damages, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
Robertson, supra note 11, at 232. One court concluded mental distress damages give a blessing to
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requiring proof of actual injury should be extended to public figure and public
28 8
official cases.
Dissatisfaction with punitive damages in libel actions has been growing
recently in courts not only in the United States but also in England. 2 9 A
committee reporting to the British Parliament has recommended legislation
which would abolish punitive damages in libel actions.2 90 The committee
"capricious jury verdicts." AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publishing,
Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580, 589 (Ind. CL App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
Apparently the drafters of the Restatement immediately preceding Gertz had anticipated the
Court would declare that damages such as mental distress were unconstitutional because "they
are not subject to specific measurement and are therefore not subject to adequate court control .... "
See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Explanatory Notes § 621, comment b at 287 (Tent. Draft.
No. 20, 1974). Perhaps because it realized that juries might use the mental suffering category to
award damages punitive in nature, the Massachusetts court which held punitive damages
unconstitutional in libel actions also required that trial and appeals judges exercise "a special duty
of vigilance in charging juries and reviewing verdicts to see that damages are no more than
330 N.E.2d 161, 170
compensatory." Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., -Mass.-,
(1975).
Justice Brennan also suggested that the inclusion of mental distress in the category of actual
injury would in most cases present an issue of triable fact and thus remove the remedy of a
summary judgment for publishers wishing to dispose of a libel suit without the expense of
extended litigation. The net result would be a greater chilling effect because of the fear of large
litigation costs. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
accord, Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, Inc., 542 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1976).
But in spite of this criticism of the mental distress category, Gertz still provides more protection
than did the common law. Gertz requires competent evidence on the issue of mental suffering.
See 418 U.S. at 350. Thus, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460-61 n.6 (1976), a jury
verdict of $100,000 for emotional distress was upheld, but it was supported by evidence from at
least five witnesses including a physician who had prescribed a sedative for the plaintiff. Such a
rule, if adopted in public figure and public official cases, would significantly reduce the discretion
vested in a jury to use common-law compensatory damages to return a verdict punitive in nature.
288. The Supreme Court of Alabama considered the arguments made in Gertz against the
common-law presumption of damages so compelling that it held there must be proof of actual
injury in public official as well as private figure cases. Bryan v. Brown, 339 So. 2d 577, 583-84
(Ala. 1976).
289. See Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1972] A.C. 1027, 1087, where Lord Reid wrote: "To
allow pure punishment [through punitive damages in libel cases] contravenes almost every
principle which has been evolved for the protection of offenders. . . . There is no limit to the
punishment except that it must not be unreasonable. The punishment is not inflicted by a judge
who has experience and at least tries not to be influenced by emotion: it is inflicted by a jury
without experience of law or punishment and often swayed by considerations which every judge
would put out of his mind.... It is no excuse to say that we need not waste sympathy on people
who behave outrageously. Are we wasting sympathy on vicious criminals when we insist on
proper legal safeguards for them?"
The reasoning used in American cases that punitive damages stifle free speech would apparently not appeal to Lord Reid, who rejected an argument that "to allow punitive damages...
would hamper other publishers or limit their freedom to conduct their business ....
" Id. at
1088-89.
290. Report of the Committee on Defamation, Cmnd. 5909, at 94-7 (1975). This report was
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reached its conclusion largely on the grounds that punitive damages are
29 1
The case for
arbitrary and fulfill no essential function in libel law.
abolishing punitive damages in public figure and public official cases, or at
least restricting their award to cases of flagrant abuse of the right of
publication, is far more compelling in the United States where the right of free
public debate enjoys the privileged protection of the first amendment.

Nicholas J. Jollymore
critically noted in 39 Modem L. Rev. 187 (1976), mainly on the ground that the abolition of
punitive damages would remove the only deterrent to "the occasional defendant who will make
sufficient profit from a scandalous book to be able to snap his fingers at a defamation action." Id.
at 193.
291.

Report of the Committee on Defamation, Cmnd. 5909, at 96 (1975). The Committee

concluded punitive damages were unnecessary, especially since English law allows "aggravated
compensatory damages." Id. In such a case the English law parallels the American law In cases
where common-law malice is required as a condition to the award of punitive damages.

